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ABSTRACT
A Comprehensive Study of the Hardware Trojan and Side-Channel Attacks in
Three-Dimensional (3D) Integrated Circuits (ICs)
by
Zhiming Zhang
University of New Hampshire, September, 2021
Three-dimensional (3D) integration is emerging as promising techniques for high-performance
and low-power integrated circuit (IC, a.k.a. chip) design. As 3D chips require more man-
ufacturing phases than conventional planar ICs, more fabrication foundries are involved in
the supply chain of 3D ICs. Due to the globalized semiconductor business model, the ex-
tended IC supply chain could incur more security challenges on maintaining the integrity,
confidentiality, and reliability of integrated circuits and systems. In this work, we analyze
the potential security threats induced by the integration techniques for 3D ICs and propose
effective attack detection and mitigation methods. More specifically, we first propose a com-
prehensive characterization for 3D hardware Trojans in the 3D stacking structure. Practical
experiment based quantitative analyses have been performed to assess the impact of 3D
Trojans on computing systems. Our analysis shows that advanced attackers could exploit
the limitation of the most recent 3D IC testing standard IEEE Standard 1838 to bypass
the tier-level testing and successfully implement a powerful TSV-Trojan in 3D chips. We
propose an enhancement for IEEE Standard 1838 to facilitate the Trojan detection on two
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neighboring tiers simultaneously. Next, we develop two 3D Trojan detection methods. The
proposed frequency-based Trojan-activity identification (FTAI) method can differentiate the
frequency changes induced by Trojans from those caused by process variation noise, outper-
forming the existing time-domain Trojan detection approaches by 38% in Trojan detection
rate. Our invariance checking based Trojan detection method leverages the invariance among
the 3D communication infrastructure, 3D network-on-chips (NoCs), to tackle the cross-tier
3D hardware Trojans, achieving a Trojan detection rate of over 94%. Furthermore, this work
investigates another type of common security threat, side-channel attacks. We first propose
to group the supply voltages of different 3D tiers temporally to drive the crypto unit imple-
mented in 3D ICs such that the noise in power distribution network (PDN) can be induced
to obfuscate the original power traces and thus mitigates correlation power analysis (CPA)
attacks. Furthermore, we study the side-channel attack on the logic locking mechanism in
monolithic 3D ICs and propose a logic-cone conjunction (LCC) method and a configura-





1.1 Three-Dimensional (3D) Integration Circuit (IC) Is The Solution of Future
Integration
As the semiconductor manufacturing process is approaching the physical limit of silicon,
it is difficult to continue the Moore’s Law [4]. Innovative integration is one of the ways to
achieve “More than Moore” [5]. Three-dimensional (3D) integration emerges as a strong can-
didate [6], which vertically integrates multiple independently fabricated integrated circuits
(ICs) as 3D tiers [7]. The stacked 3D structure can effectively increase the device density.
Furthermore, the utilization of through-silicon vias (TSVs) as inter-tier connections reduces
the global wire length, thus improving system performance and saving power consumption
on global interconnect.
1.2 Security Threats of 3D ICs
However, 3D ICs may bring in unique and new security vulnerabilities [8]. The outsourcing
fabrication of individual 3D tiers of the stacked 3D ICs provides malicious foundries a chance
to perform malicious hardware modifications, such as hardware Trojan attacks. Moreover,
side-channel attacks are a group of big threat to the security and integrity of 3D ICs, too.
1.2.1 Security Threats from Hardware Trojan
Besides the vulnerabilities in the fabrication process of stacked 3D ICs, the special stacking
structure leaves attackers more exploration space to build new types of hardware Trojans [9].
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Hardware Trojan can be defined as the malicious modifications to the original circuit or
the malicious extra logic added to the circuit. It usually aims at either altering the logic
function of the circuit or leaking important information. Those new types of hardware Tro-
jans built in 3D ICs are the 3D Trojans that have never been explored so very dangerous.
Split manufacturing techniques have been used as a protection mechanism against hard-
ware Trojan attacks which separate a complete design into incomplete portions for multiple
foundries, thus thwarting reverse engineering attacks and bringing difficulties to Trojan in-
sertion. Unfortunately, the heuristics of electronic design automation tools could nullify the
split manufacturing effort regarding the mitigation of either reverse engineering or hardware
Trojan [10,11].
1.2.2 Security Threats from Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel attack (SCA) retrieves the secret key applied in a crypographic device by ana-
lyzing the side-channel signals (e.g., power, delay, and electromagnetic leakage) gained from
the physical implementation of that device. Among various power-based SCAs, correlation
power analysis (CPA) attack outperforms simple power analysis (SPA) attack and differen-
tial power analysis (DPA) attack [12], receiving more attentions [13,14]. Existing efforts on
CPA attacks and their counteracting techniques are primarily limited in the context of hard-
ware implemented with two-dimensional (2D) ICs. Unfortunately, studies of CPA attack in
context of the 3D ICs have not been widely explored yet. Although some surveys [15, 16]
envision that SCA in 3D ICs may be more challenging than in 2D ICs, but neither physical
experiment nor quantitative analysis is available. Moreover, SCA also becomes an emerging
attack to logic locking [17], which can be used in monolithic 3D (M3D) ICs [3] to mitigate
intellectual property (IP) piracy attacks, aiming at retrieving the locking key.
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1.3 The Main Contributions of This Dissertation
In this dissertation, we present our works on securing 3D ICs from hardware Trojan attacks
and side-channel attacks. More specifically, the main contributions of this dissertation are
summarized as follows.
1. We propose a high-level 3D hardware Trojan characterization including four represen-
tative 3D Trojan models.
2. We implement the proposed cross-tier 3D Trojan model to create a TSV-based Trojan
and propose a two-tier activation (T2A) testing enhancement method for the most
recent 3D IC testing standard to detect this new 3D Trojan.
3. A frequency-based Trojan-activity identification method (FTAI) is further proposed to
detect the 3D Trojans designed based on our Trojan models.
4. An invariance checking based method, which leverages 3D network-on-chips (NoCs) to
tackle 3D Trojans, is further introduced.
5. A temporally varied supply voltage (TVSV) method is proposed which utilizes the
internal noise of 3D IC’s power distribution network (PDN) to mitigate the CPA attacks
in 3D ICs
6. A logic-cone conjunction (LCC) method and a configuration guideline is proposed for
the logic locking mechanism used in M3D ICs to improve their CPA resilience.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the proposed 3D
Trojan characterization. The practical example for each Trojan case is provided. Chapter 3
introduces the proposed TSV-based 3D Trojan and the proposed T2A testing scheme. Chap-
ter 4 introduces the proposed FTAI method to detect 3D Trojans. Chapter 5 demonstrates
the proposed invariance checking based 3D Trojan detection method. Chapter 6 introduces
the TVSV CPA mitigation method for 3D ICs. Chapter 7 presents the proposed methods
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for improving the CPA resilience of M3D IC’s logic locking mechanisms. This dissertation
is concluded in Chapter 8.
4
CHAPTER 2
Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and
Experimental Impact Assessment
2.1 Introduction
Since 2007, hardware Trojans inserted in 2D ICs have been well studied in the literature [18–
22]. To facilitate Trojan detection, researchers categorize hardware Trojans based on their
distribution, structure, size, and logic type. Depending on the activation mechanism, a
hardware Trojan can be classified as internally or externally triggered. Based on how often
hardware Trojans are triggered, the work [23] presents three types of Trojans: always-on,
combinational condition triggered, and sequential condition triggered. Once the Trojan
trigger condition arrives, the Trojan payload will execute the defined malicious operations,
such as transmitting confidential information, modifying function, degrading performance,
and consuming extra power.
Thanks to the mature models for 2D Trojans, various functional testing and side-channel
analysis approaches have been proposed to detect different kinds of hardware Trojans in 2D
ICs [19, 24–26]. However, Trojan detection methods for 3D Trojans have not been widely
explored yet. One important reason for that is the lack of a well-established 3D Trojan
model. Due to the vertical integration of multiple tiers, 3D Trojans appear with different
characteristics than 2D Trojans [9]. Thus, the commonly used Trojan detection methods for
2D Trojans may not be effective to protect chips from 3D Trojans.
In this chapter, we introduce four 3D hardware Trojan models. Furthermore, we highlight
the difference between 2D and 3D Trojans using architectural comparison and quantitative
5
assessment with practical implementations. More specifically, the main contributions are
summarized as follows.
1. We made the first thorough survey on hardware Trojans in 3D ICs. Security threats and
hardware Trojan models reported in existing literature are compared in this chapter.
2. Four representable high-level 3D hardware Trojan cases are characterized. Practical
examples for each Trojan model are provided for quantitative analysis. The difference
between 2D and 3D Trojans are highlighted in our study.
3. As the thermal issue is prominent in 3D ICs, we designed a thermal-induced 3D hard-
ware Trojan and examined its triggering speed and resilience against Trojan detection
in a 3D environment for a pass-code authentication.
4. Multiple FPGA boards were utilized to emulate the multi-tier collaborative hardware
Trojans, through which attackers can manipulate the function of the target tier without
direct tampering on the victim circuit.
5. We examined the success rate of an existing 2D hardware Trojan detection method in
the context of 3D ICs. Our simulation results show that the 2D approach operated in
3D chips is not as effective as it works in the 2D scenario.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 summarizes the security
threats and hardware Trojan models for 3D ICs discussed in the existing literature. Section
2.3 proposes comprehensive characterization models for 3D Trojans and their practical im-
plementations. Simulation and emulation results for the 3D Trojans are presented in Section
2.3, too. The effectiveness of a 2D hardware Trojan detection method applied in the scenario
of 3D IC is examined in section 2.4. This chapter is concluded in Section 2.5.
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Table 2.1: Existing Work on Hardware Trojan in 3D ICs
Existing
Work
Threat Model Trojan Model
Threat source Attackers’ access Trigger Payload Location
[27] Untrusted die foundries GDSII files
Thermal effect caused
transition glitches
No special requirement Any tiers in 3D ICs
[28] Untrusted die foundries GDSII files
Thermal effect caused
transition glitches
No special requirement Middle tier in 3D ICs
[8]
Untrusted interconnect foundries















Impacts on target’s power
Impacts on target’s delay
TSV
Multiple tiers
[30] Untrusted single die manufacturers Least critical die Low-activity nets
Leak key from
encryption unit
Trojan in different tiers
with encryption unit




in 3D ICs stack
[32] Final bounding foundries Entire layers Internal nets No special requirement Any tiers in 3D ICs
[33] Untrusted single die manufacturers GDSII files No special requirement No special requirement Any tiers in 3D ICs
2.2 Our Survey on Existing Hardware Trojans in 3D Integrated Circuits and
Systems
The increased number of dies in 3D ICs and vertical-dimension integration potentially leave
more attack surfaces open for adversaries to implement hardware Trojans. As multiple dies
are vertically integrated into 3D systems, additional manufacturing steps are needed in 3D
IC fabrication flow than in their 2D counterparts. Multiple foundries for dies and vertical
interconnects will be involved in the 3D integration. In the current semiconductor business
model, more and more chip designs are outsourced for fabrication. As a result, neither all
single die fabrication foundries nor vertical interconnect manufacturers are trusted [8,27–30,
33]. The die-to-die bonding may be performed in an untrusted foundry, too. In Fig. 2.1,
we label the possible attack surfaces for 3D Trojan insertion. Trojans can be placed by
the single-die manufacturing foundries, independently or cooperatively. Since the bonding
foundries have access to all the single dies, they have a more likely-hood to implement a
Trojan involving multiple dies.
Based on the existing literature, we categorize the 3D Trojans in Table 2.1, where we
highlight the threat model with special emphasis on threat source and attack target. In
addition to Trojan trigger and payload mechanisms, we also identify Trojan locations in 3D
ICs. From Table 2.1 we can see, the nature of the 3D IC structure creates new opportunities
for hardware Trojan design, for instance, thermal-based Trojans and cross-tier Trojans. In
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Figure 2.1: 3D hardware Trojan insertion in untrusted foundries.
the next three subsections, we discuss the existing literature listed in Table 2.1 according to
their special trigger mechanisms and Trojan locations.
2.2.1 Thermal-triggered 3D Trojans
The fact of poor heat dissipation in a stacked 3D IC can be exploited to develop Trojan trig-
gers. Although the techniques such as heat sink, liquid cooling, thermal-driven floorplanning
and routing, and thermal TSV insertion [34] could address the thermal issue in 3D ICs at
certain degree, the heat dissipation along a path could harm the tiers and degrade the chip
performance [35]. The heat generated and accumulated in the chip will change the electrical
parameters of transistors and the switching speed of logic gates. Thus, the system may have
new (and unspecified) transition states. The unexpected transition glitches can be employed
to design Trojan triggers.
As indicated in [27, 28], thermal-triggered Trojans can be inserted by any malicious
foundries with access to the layout of designs. Those Trojans likely congregate near the
middle tier, where heat dissipation is harder than in other tiers [28]. The work [8] demon-
strates that a thermal triggered Trojan may be hidden in 3D interposers. Thermal Trojans
can speed up circuit component aging and consequently lead to a Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack [8].
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2.2.2 Cross-Tier 3D Trojans
The multiple-die structure of 3D ICs allows attackers to spread the circuit for a Trojan
to multiple tiers. This type of Trojans could be inserted by untrusted die manufacturers,
interconnect foundries, and unified foundries. The cross-tier concept means that either the
trigger and payload circuits of cross-tier Trojans are separated into different tiers, or the
trigger circuit split in multiple tiers is activated jointly to enable the payload [29]. The
cross-tier Trojans may not be detected by functional testing performed on each individual
die since the Trojan trigger condition is extremely rare. The work [30] demonstrates a Trojan
located in a different tier than the encryption unit facilitates to leak the secret key. Even if
the untrusted foundry only has partial knowledge of the 3D chip, they can launch cross-tier
Trojan attacks.
2.2.3 Trojans Exploiting Other 3D Features
The work [31] envisions a new hardware Trojan in stacked 3D ICs: a malicious die is placed
between other tiers in the 3D stack. That malicious die, carrying Trojan circuits, may
interrupt normal operations in other 3D tiers or store secret information passing through
the Trojan tier. Due to the prominent process variation in 3D chips, it is not easy to
differentiate the extra delay induced by the 3D hardware Trojan. This type of Trojan can
be inserted by untrusted die assemblers. For instance, the work [32] describes that attackers
from the bonding foundry could leverage outsourced dies to implement 3D Trojans. In [33],
the adversary is an untrusted die manufacturing foundry with access to GDSII files.
2.3 Proposed Comprehensive Characterization of 3D Hardware Trojans
The existing literature mentioned in Table 2.1 showcases diverse 3D Trojans, but they neither
have a thorough discussion on the exact Trojan models nor provide quantitative impact
assessment. We provide a solution by characterizing four representable 3D hardware Trojan
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Figure 2.2: Proposed characterization of 3D hardware Trojans.
cases and quantitatively analyzing their practical examples in the following sections.
The major difference between 2D and 3D hardware Trojans is whether or not the Trojan
trigger and payload circuits are located in the same tier where the target circuit resides. In
2D chips, the Trojan circuit co-exists with the victim in the same tier. One could perform
testing or side-channel analysis to detect the presence of 2D Trojans. In contrast, conven-
tional testing on 3D chips is typically done in a separate fashion. The die for each tier is
tested individually before 3D integration. Once the good dies are stacked vertically, limited
testing will be performed to detect the defects between die-to-die connections, rather than
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extensively examining the correctness of the 3D system’s behavior [36].
Based on our survey in Section 2.2, we characterize the 3D hardware Trojan with four
cases shown in Fig. 2.2. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first efforts that in-
troduce comprehensive characterization for 3D hardware Trojans. The following subsections
present four 3D Trojan cases in detail.
2.3.1 CASE 1: Cross-Tier Trojan Trigger
Characteristics
In case 1, the trigger circuit of the 3D Trojan is placed in tier 1 while the payload circuit
is located near the Trojan target. This type of 3D Trojan is similar to the 2D Trojans
that are triggered by an external signal [37], but it is more difficult to mitigate compared
to the 2D Trojan. In 2D chips, the passive attack from the external trigger signals can be
alleviated by adding shielding material or using unit isolation. In contrast, in 3D ICs, the
external attack may be originated from the adjacent tiers, which are not removable after
the 3D chip fabrication is completed. As heterogeneous 3D integration emerges, varieties of
external trigger mechanisms could be implemented in the other 3D tiers, thus challenging
the prevention of 3D Trojans. Moreover, since the payload circuit may never or rarely be
enabled without the valid cross-tier trigger signal, the symptom of Trojan attacks will not
be observed in typical functional testing. Thus, this type of Trojan is stealthy.
We illustrate the case 1 Trojan with an example shown in Fig. 2.3. The trigger circuit
is a heat generator in the top tier. The payload circuit is a temperature-sensitive resistor,
which is built in the authentication unit in the middle tier. When the heat from the top tier
propagates to the middle tier, the temperature-sensitive resistor could alter the delay of the
critical path or cause timing violations, thus resulting in a malfunction of the authentication
unit. As reported in [28], the heat from the middle tier of a 3D vertical stacking structure
is accumulated easily due to the relatively long dissipation path to the heat sink. Hence, the
thermal triggered Trojans will be more likely deployed in 3D integrated circuits and systems
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Figure 2.3: Thermal triggered cross-tier Trojan.
than its 2D counterpart.
We performed a transistor-level simulation in Cadence Virtuoso to demonstrate the im-
pact of middle-tier heat dissipation on neighboring tiers. We collected the transient current
of the nodes for load connection in the middle tier of our 3D power distribution network
(PDN) model [38] to evaluate the thermal effect. Our target module for the thermal effect
investigation is an 8-bit S-box module of AES. In the middle tier, we had 30 load nodes
arranged as 5 rows by 6 columns and then captured the current of each node for 10 ns. The
current collected in the 8th ns is shown in the contour graphs Fig. 2.4. Generally, the 3D
PDN carries greater currents than the 2D PDN. Although the highest current for both 2D
and 3D cases appears in the bottom left area where the S-box is located, the current distri-
bution near the S-box is different in the 3D PDN compared to the 2D PDN. We highlight
the difference with red dashed rectangles in Figs. 2.4(a) and (b). Those observations make
sense because any single tier in the 3D chip is not isolated but impacted by its neighboring
tiers. Since the thermal dissipation of a circuit is proportional to its current, it is reasonable
to believe that the temperature surrounding our target is influenced by its neighboring tiers.
To perform quantitative analysis for the cross-tier 3D hardware Trojan, we conducted a
case study on a platform composed of Xilinx Nexys3 Spartan-6 FPGA, TI MSP430FR6989
12
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Figure 2.4: Current contour maps of (a) 2D and (b) 3D PDNs.
LaunchPad board, IRF540 MOSFET transistor, and an NTC thermistor. The purpose of
this case study is to verify the implementation feasibility of the thermal Trojan (similar to
the one shown in Fig. 2.3) and compare its activation efficiency between the scenarios of
2D and 3D ICs. The overview of our experimental setup is depicted in Fig. 2.5. The main
component of the heat generator circuit is a MOSFET driven by the FPGA board. The
MOSFET could burn when its gate voltage exceeds a voltage threshold and the MOSFET
temperature can be as high as 175°C. The sensor circuit composed of an NTC thermistor
and multiple resistors in series is powered by the TI microcontroller. When the thermistor
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Figure 2.5: Experimental setup for the emulation of thermal-triggered hardware Trojan in
3D ICs.
senses an increase in the temperature in the surrounding air, its resistance starts to drop.
This leads to a reduction in the voltage across the thermistor. To emulate the 2D scenario
for comparison, we added a heat sink for the heat generator circuit, to provide a better heat
dissipation which is commonly available in 2D ICs.
An authentication system is programmed in the microcontroller to examine the password
provided externally. The microcontroller also detects the voltage level of the thermistor. A
Trojan trigger logic is programmed in the FPGA to monitor the two input signals controlled
by the two switches on the FPGA board. The triggered Trojan turns on the MOSFET (thus
it starts to burn) to heat the temperature in the surrounding area. Once the thermistor
senses the increased temperature, the microcontroller detects the change on voltage and
then drives the authentication system to jump to the password reset status, which is usually
only available to legal users. We successfully mimicked a 3D thermal-triggered hardware
Trojan and overwrote the authentication password in our hardware demo [39].
Next, we compared the activation speed of the thermal-triggered Trojans for 2D and 3D
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Table 2.2: Trojan Activation Efficiency.
Emulation scenarios Time to trigger the Trojan (min)
2D 11:12
3D 6:52
Figure 2.6: Resistance dropping of the thermistor used in Fig. 2.5.
scenarios. We used the microcontroller to implement a threshold comparator to examine
the voltage level of the thermistor. If the voltage of a thermistor exceeds the threshold, the
Trojan payload will reset the authentication password. We warmed the air surrounding the
thermistor with and without the heat sink to mimic 2D and 3D scenarios, respectively. A
timer is used to measure the time that the thermistor takes to drop the voltage below the
threshold for each case. The results shown in Table 2.2 indicate that the Trojan activation
time in the 2D scenario is almost twice compared to the 3D case. This means it is easier
to implement thermal-triggered Trojans in 3D ICs than in 2D chips. We also measured the
speed of temperature changing, which is reflected in the resistance of the thermistor. The
dropping trend of the resistance in Fig. 2.6 implies that the NTC thermistor’s resistance for
the 3D case drops faster than the 2D. This fact further confirms that heat can be better
accumulated in 3D than 2D. Thus, 3D ICs will provide a better environment to facilitate
the implementation of thermal-based Trojans than 2D ICs.
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2.3.2 CASE 2: Cross-Tier Trojan Payload
Characteristics
In the Trojan described in case 2, the payload is located in the top tier (tier 1), from where
it is relatively easy to probe and measure side-channel signals than from the middle tier.
The motivation of this type of 3D Trojan is to steal confidential information from the victim
unit. Essentially, the stacked structure of 3D ICs provides a reliable medium for attackers
to collect information from the middle and bottom tiers. In addition, as the payload resides
in another tier, the effect of this kind of Trojans will not be observable while testing on the
individual tiers. Here, we assume that the trigger circuit is small enough to hide its area,
delay, and power overhead. This assumption is as reasonable as what we usually have in 2D
ICs.
The cross-tier Trojan can facilitate the development of a covert channel to leak infor-
mation. The victim unit could be an encryption engine, such as the one shown in Fig. 2.7.
The crypto key is loaded from the volatile memory in the top tier. To prevent the leaked
key from being visible during the middle tier testing, the pilfered key is first transformed
into another format (i.e., obfuscated key), and then the Trojan passes the obfuscated key to
the rarely used main memory in the top tier. When we test the top tier, the main memory
functions normally. The separated testing on the middle tier will not reveal the presence of
the 3D Trojan because the key is obfuscated. However, the key will be leaked by the covert
channel built by the cross-tier 3D Trojan since the attacker knows how to de-obfuscate the
key.
Example Analysis
In this subsection, we use a combination of transistor-level simulation and FPGA emulation
to demonstrate the feasibility of leaking the AES secret key via cross-tier Trojans. We
implemented the cross-tier hardware Trojan and the 3D system shown in Fig. 2.8 in Cadence
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Figure 2.7: An example of key leaking via the covert channel formed by a hardware Trojan
in a stacked 3D IC.
Virtuoso with a 45nm NCSU FreePDK technology [40]. The PDN in each tier of the stacked
3D structure is mainly composed of a global power grid and a virtual grid. TSVs connect
the global power grids in nearby tiers. The parameters for the TSV and wire model are
listed in Table 2.3. The parameters are verified by [40, 41]. Our transistor-level 3D circuit
nearly matches the practical 3D IC. The crypto unit adopted here is a transistor-level AES
S-box. To ensure the unipolarity of the channel between key and TSV, a buffer is located
in the middle of the channel (not shown in the diagram) so that we can prevent the power
data from being transmitted back to the S-box to hinder normal operation. The hardware
Trojan shown in Fig. 2.8 stealthily passes the secret key to a nearby 3D tier. The main
component of the Trojan is a capacitor connected with the PDN. Each key is assigned to
one Trojan capacitor. The Trojan capacitors are charged or discharged based on the key bits
transmitted through TSVs. The charges stored in the Trojan capacitor CT will facilitate the
side-channel analysis for the crypto key retrieval. The capacitor CT acts like a decoupling
capacitor, which can keep the supply power stable. In this way, the normal function of
the nearby tier will not be affected so that the stealthiness of the inserted Trojan can be
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Table 2.3: Parameters for TSV and Wire Model
TSV Model (per TSV) [42]
Diameter Height Pitch Resistance Inductance Capacitance
10 µm 60 µm 20 µm 20 mΩ 34.94 pH 283 fF
RC Model for Local Wire Interconnect (per mm) [41]
Resistance Capacitance
3.31 kΩ 170.59 fF
Figure 2.8: Experimental setup of key leaking via a cross-tier Trojan.
achieved.
In our experiment, we set the key bits to “11111111”, and varied CT from 10fF, 1132fF,
to 11320fF. The power consumption of the S-box without Trojan or with different Trojan
loads was measured and compared. As shown in Fig. 2.9(a), a smaller Trojan capacitor
leads to a smaller power change, but the power difference induced by the Trojan is still less
than 2.5% even though we increase CT to 11320fF. However, the power profiles for different
Trojan capacitors are consistent. The slight but consistent variation on the power profile is an
important quality to ensure the stealthiness of the cross-tier Trojan. We kept the capacitance
of the Trojan as 11320fF but changed the key bits from “11111111”, “00000000”, “01010101”,
to “01001011”. The power consumption for these four cases is shown in Fig. 2.9(b). It can
be observed that the power consumption for each key is unique. Thus, we can correlate the
new power profile with the key used in the crypto unit.
Next, we used a SAKURA-G FPGA assessment kit to conduct a side-channel analysis
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Figure 2.9: Impact of cross-tier Trojans on the power consumption of an AES S-box. (a)
Power differences caused by the Trojans implemented with different Trojan capacitors, and
(b) unique power profiles induced by the same Trojan that snoops the AES S-box with
different keys.
on an AES affected by the cross-tier Trojan. The Trojan model AES-T1000 published on




Figure 2.10: Correlation power analysis for the AES (a) without Trojan and (b) with Trojan.
is, we used FPGA pins to mimic the Trojan capacitors. Each key bit additionally drives
eight FPGA pins. Due to the capacitor induced by the Trojan, the total power consumption
of the AES module is slightly changed. However, the power difference due to the Trojan
accelerates the correlation power analysis (CPA) attack. The key retrieval processes for cases
of without Trojan and with Trojan are shown in Fig. 2.10. The red lines represent the 16 key
bytes of AES. As the number of analyzed traces increases, the red lines are getting out of
the green zone, which means the key bytes are being retrieved. As a result, the CPA attack
on the AES with Trojan is able to retrieve all the key bytes within the use of 6000 power
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traces. Given the same amount of power traces, the CPA attack without Trojan retrieves
only 14 key bytes out of 16 since two lines are still buried in the green zone. This indicates
that the Trojan implemented in this example could ease the CPA attack.
2.3.3 CASE 3: Multi-Tier Collaborative Trojan
Characteristics
There may emerge another kind of 3D Trojan, multi-tier collaborative Trojan, which is more
sophisticated than the cross-tier Trojan trigger and payload. The multi-tier Trojan in case
3 shown in Fig. 2.2 is activated by the two trigger circuits from tiers 1 and 2, respectively.
Compared to hardware Trojans in 2D ICs, the multi-tier Trojan trigger has significantly
lower Trojan triggering probability due to a larger pool of trigger signals. Moreover, the
collaborative Trojan trigger could be a combination of different trigger mechanisms (e.g.,
temperature, voltage level, and electromagnetic flux). Multi-tier collaborative Trojans rep-
resent the scenario that attackers exploit the security weaknesses of other tiers in the 3D
system to breach the target tier with strong security mechanisms, instead of compromising
the target tier directly. In terms of cost and effectiveness, multi-tier Trojans are more likely
to appear in 3D chips than a single-tier Trojan.
We implemented an example of a multi-tier collaborative Trojan in a 3D system with
4 tiers. Two FPGA boards, each including two FPGA chips, were utilized to emulate
the 3D system. The schematic diagram and FPGA setup are shown in Figs. 2.11(a) and
(b), respectively. Tiers 1 and 2 are weak in the sense of resistance against hardware Trojan
insertion. Thus, two hardware Trojan triggers were placed in those two tiers. The 3D Trojan
manipulates the signals passing images from tiers 1 and 2 to tier 3. Due to their low trigger
probability, sequential hardware Trojan (SHT) triggers were applied in this example. When
the SHT trigger is active, the vertical data communication is compromised such that the valid
indication signals vda and vdb will allow improper operands a and b to propagate to tier 3.
Consequently, the compromised inputs ṽda and ṽdb lead the Trojan target circuit to behave
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differently (g̃) than the normal specification (g). Once the valid signals are compromised by
the 3D Trojans, the integrity of the images received by tier 3 will be sabotaged. As a result,
image-based authentication will fail.
Example Analysis
In the FPGA platform, we connected those FPGA chips with external wires so that the tier-
to-tier communication can be manipulated and observed via the oscilloscope. Figure 2.11(c)
illustrates that the square-wave signal from tier 1 (the yellow line on the top) is not passed
to tier 3 (as the blue signal on the bottom is flat). When the Trojan is triggered, a portion
of the yellow line is copied to the blue signal as shown in Fig. 2.11(d). This indicates that
the multi-tier collaborative Trojan manipulates the signal filter, which is controlled by the
valid signal, and transfers invalid or even malicious data to the target tier. Assume tier 3
in the 3D system examines whether the images from the top two tiers are highly correlated
and then enables the critical mission programmed in tier 3. If the valid signals vda and vdb
are tampered by the multi-tier collaborative Trojan, dummy image rows will be dumped
to tier 3. Five images shown in Fig. 2.12 are adopted for correlation analysis in the 3D
system mentioned above. Clearly, Figs. 2.12(b)-(e) are different than Fig. 2.12(a), thus the
image correlation cannot get close to 0.9. However, when the valid signals for enabling image
transfer between tiers are compromised, the image correlation could approach to 0.9 if the
hardware Trojan is able to manipulate vda and vdb for a time period long enough to dump
100 dummy image rows.
2.3.4 CASE 4: Multi-Tier Synergic Trojan Payload
Characteristics
When an IC is expended from planar to vertical dimension, the corresponding Trojan pay-
load will be distributed to multiple tiers as well. In case 4 shown in Fig. 2.2, the Trojan





Figure 2.11: Multi-tier collaborative hardware Trojan. (a) Conceptual diagram, (b) multi-
FPGAs experimental setup, (c) normal output, and (d) Trojan affected output.
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Figure 2.12: Impact of multi-tier collaborative hardware Trojans in an image authentication
application. (a) Image generated in tier 1, (b)-(e) Images for comparison provided by tier 2,
and (f) correlation analysis results obtained from tier 3.
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Figure 2.13: Multi-tier synergic hardware Trojan payload causing malfunction, communica-
tion livelock, and information leaking.
confidential information is leaked from tier 2 to other tiers. Often time, both the Trojan
trigger and payload are located in the different tiers than the target one. Alternatively, a
thin Trojan tier can be integrated into the 3D stack structure to provide flexible and precise
control on the snooped information without incurring noticeable delay overhead [31]. We
further envision that a 3D Trojan payload could achieve a synergic attack effect in multiple
tiers, rather than influencing each tier independently. In summary, a multi-tier synergic
Trojan has the potential to impact a bigger area than a 2D Trojan. It will be challenging
for module-level testing for a subsystem to identify the underlying security threat in the 3D
system. The symptom of a synergic Trojan may seem benign from the viewpoint of a small
local area. More importantly, the increased impact area of the synergic Trojan payload will
make the technique of isolating malicious hardware ineffective or unrealistic since multiple
tiers are involved.
Example Analysis
3D network-on-chip (NoC) [43, 44] has been demonstrated as a promising infrastructure to
integrate increasing transistors in multiple tiers. 3D NoC eliminates the need for long global
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interconnects and reduces the voltage droop and power consumption on long wires. A rogue
2D NoC leads to information leaking and bandwidth depletion [45]. If NoC-based 3D ICs
have a synergic Trojan placed in some IP cores or 3D switches, that Trojan leads to a similar
consequence, as shown in Fig. 2.13. The rogue IP core sends an NoC instruction packet to
the rogue switch. Next, the rogue switch passes that malicious packet to the victim IP
core in the bottom tier. As a result, the multi-tier synergic Trojan eventually causes the
victim IP core to have malfunctions. Or, the rogue switch in the middle tier could trigger
a livelock between the middle and bottom tiers. The proposed multi-tier synergic Trojan is
stealthy because the hardware of the rogue IP core and switch has high similarity with the
normal ones and the ‘rogue’ feature is only visible at the arrival time of special NoC packets.
Figure 2.13 illustrates another practical example of the case 4 Trojan model. The rogue
switch and IP core tampered by a hardware Trojan monitor the special packet transferring
through the middle tier and the packet of interest in the rogue IP core is stored for future
use and analysis. In the case of passing malicious packets in NoCs, the rogue IP core is
the Trojan trigger to initialize the attack by issuing the malicious instructions. The rogue
3D switch is the payload, which causes malfunction by delivering malicious instructions to
the victim IP cores. The trigger and payload are from different tiers but none of them is
in the same tier where the victim locates. In the case of information leaking, the payload
formed by a rogue 3D switch is responsible for leaking NoC packets. Although the trigger
and payload for this case are in the same tier, they remotely control the victims in other
tiers. The Trojan type proposed in this subsection is non-invasive. Moreover, the snooping
attack is hidden in the normal data transmission of the middle tier. Side-channel analysis
of the entire system may not be able to detect the presence of such hardware Trojans.
2.4 Examination of A 2D Trojan Detection Approach in 3D IC
The existing Trojan detection methods are mainly designed for the Trojans in 2D ICs. Due
to the unique characteristics of 3D Trojans, as analyzed in Section 2.3, they may not work
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well in 3D scenarios. Split manufacturing may impact the hardware Trojan insertion in 3D
ICs at some level. However, the adversaries in untrusted foundries with partial design details
might be able to reverse engineer the whole design. Once the design is recovered, attackers
can continue to insert Trojans. On the other hand, split manufacturing is not for securing
the stacked 3D ICs in which every single tier is complete. This type of 3D IC is addressed
in this work. New countermeasures specifically for 3D Trojans are needed.
In this section, we applied an existing approach [19], originally designed for 2D Trojans,
to a 3D system and compared the effectiveness of Trojan detection in 2D and 3D ICs. As 3D
chips have severe internal noise, we suspect that Trojan detection using side-channel signals
will lose its detection accuracy. Thus, we chose a current based Trojan detection method.
2.4.1 Description of Trojan Detection Method for 2D ICs
The Trojan detection method we examined is Temporal Self-Referencing (TeSR) [19]. In
TeSR, a special test vector generator offers the input sequence to ensure the system go
through the identical state transitions in a period of time. A Trojan free system should
obtain identical current signatures in two consecutive time windows when it goes through
the same state transitions. Any mismatch between the two current signatures will indicate
the presence of a hardware Trojan. This method may not work well in 3D scenarios because
of the greater internal noise in 3D ICs.
2.4.2 Targeted Hardware Trojan
In the following experiment, we inserted the same MOLES Trojan mentioned in [46] to the
2D and 3D circuits. The MOLES Trojan is composed of a set of registers as a ring generator
to generate a series of random numbers, which will be XORed with the key information.
The XOR outputs will drive a set of capacitors. Attackers who know the implementation
details of the ring generator can decode the obfuscated key information via power analysis.
However, the power consumed in the load capacitors seems like noise if the random sequence
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Table 2.4: Trojan Detection Confidence for Different Victim Sizes.
1 S-box 2 S-boxes 4 S-boxes 6 S-boxes 8 S-boxes
2D +31.07% +11.84% +12.80% +80.06% +48.00%
3D -21.99% +12.61% -61.30% -24.32% -28.74%
is unknown. In the 2D case, MOLES was implemented as an external circuit on the same
tier of the target circuit. In the 3D scenario, MOLES and the victim circuit were placed in
two different tiers.
2.4.3 Efficiency of TeSR Trojan Detection Method in 2D and 3D ICs
We adopt the metric point-wise Euclidean distance (PWED) between the two current signa-
tures to assess Trojan detection efficiency, following the similar process used in the work [19].
The PWED for the Trojan free case (i.e. TrojanFree) is considered as the noise threshold. If
the PWED measured from the Trojan injected case (i.e., PWED
TrojanIn
) is higher than that
measured from the Trojan free case (i.e., PWED
TrojanFree
), the hardware Trojan is detected.
We implemented the TeSR Trojan detection method in the transistor-level 3D IC model
built with a 45nm NCSU FreePDK technology [40]. The detailed setting is as same as what
described in Section 2.3.2). One, two, four, six, and eight S-boxes were applied for the
purpose of sweeping the size of the victim circuit. The number of registers in the MOLES
ring generator was varied to observe the impact of Trojan size on Trojan detection efficiency.
Our simulation results shown in Fig. 2.14 confirm that the TeSR Trojan detection method
is generally less effective in the 3D scenarios than in the 2D cases. The inserted MOLES
Trojan can be successfully detected in the 2D environment for all victim sizes tested in
the experiment. In contrast, the Trojan in the 3D scenario is not detected in most of
the cases because the 3D PWED
TrojanIn
is lower than PWED
TrojanFree
. We further zoom
in the PWEDs for different test cases and define the confidence level of Trojan detection












Figure 2.14: Trojan detection results achieved by the TeSR approach applied in (a) 2D and
(b) 3D ICs with different sizes of victim circuits.
Table 2.4 shows ConfidenceHTD for all the test cases reported in Fig. 2.14. A positive
percentage means that the Trojan is detected. A higher percentage stands for better confi-
dence in the detection result. If the positive percentage is too small, our detection conclusion
may be changed by the interruption from some internal noise or process variations. Although
TeSR achieves a positive confidence value in the 3D TrojanIn with 2 S-boxes case, the per-
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Figure 2.15: Trojan detection efficiency of TeSR against 3D MOLES Trojans with different
sizes.









-21.99% -46.34% -16.94% -33.15%
centage of 12.61% is not as high as that in most of the 2D cases. A negative percentage
in Table 2.4 indicates that the TeSR fails to capture the Trojan. To conclude, the MOLES
Trojans in most of the 3D scenarios are not recognized by the TeSR approach.
Next, we swept the size of the MOLES Trojans from 20 to 80 registers and obtained the
corresponding PWED shown in Fig. 2.15. As can be seen, the PWED for all 3D TrojanIn
cases is less than the TrojanFree case. This indicates that the TeSR approach fails to detect
the MOLES Trojans inserted in the 3D circuits even if the Trojan size increases. Another
observation we had from our case study is, the PWED does not monotonically increase or
decrease with the Trojan size. This is summarized in Table 2.5.
2.5 Conclusion
Three-dimensional integration techniques for integrated circuits leverage vertical-dimension
space to increase the chip density and provide better performance than two-dimensional
30
chips. However, the increased number of transistors in a small footprint leaves more explo-
ration space for attackers to insert stealthy hardware Trojans. Trojans in planar integrated
circuits are well modeled and understood, but there is limited work available to investigate
hardware Trojans specifically in 3D ICs. This chapter summarizes the existing effort on 3D
hardware Trojans. To improve the awareness of potential attacks that could succeed in 3D
ICs, this chapter characterizes four representable 3D hardware Trojan cases and provides
practical simulation/emulation examples for each model. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first comprehensive work that analyzes the 3D Trojan models, especially for cross-tier
and multi-tier Trojans, and demonstrates their impact with the quantitative assessment.
Our experimental results show that 3D Trojans are feasible to be implemented in 3D in-
tegrated circuits and systems. We advocate the research community to investigate unique
Trojan detection methods for 3D hardware Trojans.
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CHAPTER 3
Two-Tier Activation (T2A) Testing Scheme for 3D ICs to Detect TSV-Based
Hardware Trojans
3.1 Introduction
Three-dimensional integrated circuits (3D ICs) offers higher device density, better chip per-
formance and lower power consumption than planar chips. However, the vertical communi-
cation channels, through-silicon vias (TSVs), in 3D chips bring in new concerns of reliability
and security issues. For example, the heat expansion of TSVs induces serious stress to 3D
ICs under the condition of the poor heat dissipation, which may cause damage to the de-
vice layer of each die [47]. Moreover, the coupling effect between TSVs may impact the
integrity of inter-tier communications and could even be used to form a crosstalk-based at-
tack [48,49]. The recent literature reveals that TSVs could be exploited by attackers to build
new hardware Trojans, which are more difficult to detect than the ones inserted in planar
chips [9, 50].
The testing for 3D ICs is more complicated than that for traditional 2D ICs. The multi-
tier structure in 3D ICs requires to perform multiple phase testing, including pre-bond,
mid-bond and post-bond testings [6]. The pre-bond and mid/post-bond testing check the
circuitry of individual dies and the TSV defects, respectively. To survive from the tier-level
testing, the attackers from the bonding foundry could implant the Trojans in the interface
of tier-to-tier connection. That type of Trojan will not modify the circuitry of any tiers or
tamper with any TSVs, but only alter the signals transmitted through TSVs when the Trojan
is activated. Due to the press of time-to-market, the limited functional testing performed
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after the 3D IC is packaged does not provide sufficient test coverage to detect the 3D hardware
Trojans.
The most recent 3D IC testing standard IEEE Std 1838 [51,52] provides a comprehensive
tier-level testing mechanism after the chip is packaged. Similar to the testing of multi-core
systems in 2D ICs, each die in a 3D stack is wrapped using die wrapper registers (DWRs).
The test data inputs and DWRs will control the bypass registers of dies to directly test
any single die’s logic while bypass the uninterested dies. However, the standard does not
provide a detailed testing scheme for the logic outside of DWRs but still in the die. Such
logic is known as shore logic, which are extremely important to the integrity and security
of 3D ICs because they are the interface to the TSVs. Any malicious modifications on the
TSV signals could lead to the corruption of important instructions from neighboring tiers
and cause system malfunction consequently.
In this chapter, we investigate the potential hardware Trojan insertion in the shore logic
to manipulate TSV signals. More specifically, the main contributions of this chapter are as
follows.
• We propose a TSV-based hardware Trojan that is inserted to the shore logic of 3D tiers.
More specifically, the Trojan spreads its trigger and payload logic to two neighboring
tiers and induces an extra Trojan TSV to transmit the trigger signal.
• We analysis and compare the Trojan detection probability for the proposed TSV-Trojan
with the case of conventional hardware Trojans under the testing guided by IEEE Std
1838.
• Furthermore, we propose a two-tier activation (T2A) enhancement method for IEEE
Std 1838 to examine two neighboring tiers at a time in the testing and thus facilitates
the detection of TSV-based Trojans.
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3.2 Attack Model
IEEE Std 1838 normalizes the testing on the logic function of each die of a 3D stack. As
shown in Fig 3.1, the die logic of 3D tiers is fully wrapped by DWRs which are controlled
by bypass registers. Each tier can be tested individually by setting its bypass register value.
However, the standard does not give a detailed testing approach for the shore logic. Hardware
Trojans (HTs) may be inserted to those logic to exploit the relatively weak testing feature.
Moreover, we found that IEEE Std 1838 only supports the testing mode, in which only
one tier is tested at a time. A Trojan may bypass this tier-level testing if it has Trojan
components spread among multiple tiers. The Trojan is not complete in the testing such
that the tier will not have any abnormal functions.
In our attack model, we assume that attackers have the access of the fabrication of two
neighboring tiers of a 3D IC. They can perform a hardware Trojan attack by inserting the
Trojan trigger and payload to the tiers separately. The inter-tier communication between
the Trojan components can be conducted using an extra induced TSV, labeled with Trojan
TSV in Fig. 3.1. Once the Trojan is triggered, it will corrupt the TSV signals transmitting
between the two tiers.
3.3 Proposed TSV-Based 3D Trojan
3.3.1 Description of Proposed Trojan
We assume that some attackers will exploit the fact that the IEEE Std 1838 is not capable
of testing two neighboring tiers to design a hardware Trojan, which will not be triggered in
the single-tier testing. For simplicity, we zoom in a TSV-based 3D Trojan across two tiers
as shown in Fig. 3.2. Locating in the shore logic, the Trojan trigger and payload have direct
interaction with some TSVs between two 3D tiers. The trigger circuit monitors the incoming
TSV signals to Tier 2 and generates a trigger signal for the payload when a specific input
pattern arrives. The trigger signal is propagated to the payload circuit via an extra Trojan
34
Figure 3.1: Diagram of testing structure for 3D ICs.
TSV, labeled with HT TSV in Fig. 3.2. The payload will, for example, flip the incoming
TSV signals from Tier 2 if the trigger signal is logic high.
If an advanced attacker can manipulate the bypass registers, s/he could implement a
pre-activation scheme to further increase the complicity of the TSV-based hardware Trojan.
In this type of Trojan, the trigger and payload will make use of the bypass register value
to survive from the conventional single-tier testing. The stars in Fig. 3.2 highlight the
data paths that are associated with the pre-activation scheme. The trigger and payload
will stay dormant without the proper pre-activation signals. More specifically, the trigger
circuit does not generate an active trigger signal until the bypass register of Tier 2 is logic 0,
regardless of the input pattern designed for Trojan triggering has arrived or not. Likewise,
the payload circuit cannot perform any modifications if the bypass register in Tier 1 is logic
high, no matter the trigger signal from Tier 2 is active or not. In summary, the pre-activation
condition is mandatory to enable the trigger and payload circuit to function properly. For
instance, both the trigger and payload are pre-activated only if the 3D tier they are located
in are not bypassed in the testing.
We name the TSV-based Trojans without the access to the bypass register as TSV-
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Figure 3.2: TSV-based 3D hardware Trojan attack in 3D tiers.
woBR and the more advanced Trojans that can monitor the bypass register as TSV-wBR.
In the next section, we will analyze the stealthiness of the TSV-based Trojans by deriving
the probability of successfully detecting TSV-woBR and TSV-wBR Trojans achieved by
performing the single- and two-tier testing.
3.3.2 Theoretical Probability of Successful Trojan Detection
We use the probability of successful Trojan detection (PSTD) as a metric to compare the
efficiency of different testing schemes. We assume the 3D IC in our following discussions have
N tiers and the triggering probability for the Trojan is P for a given set of input stimuli.
PSTD Obtained by Single-Tier Testing
If the single-tier testing is performed through the frame defined by the IEEE Std 1838, it
is less likely to successfully detect a TSV-based 3D Trojan than a conventional 2D Trojan.
Without loss of generality, we assume a conventional Trojan is inserted in Tier i of a 3D IC
and a TSV-based 3D Trojan involves Tiers i and i + 1. As shown in shown in Fig. 3.3(a),
the single-tier testing on Tier i can facilitate the conventional Trojan detection as long as
the Trojan is triggered by the test input and the corrupted test output is observable from
the bottom tier. In contrast, the single-tier testing on Tier i will not be able to activate the
trigger circuit of the TSV-based Trojan on Tier i+1 (since the test input will not reach Tier
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.3: Single-tier testing based (a) conventional Trojan, (b) TSV-woBR Trojan and (c)
TSV-wBR Trojan detection.
Table 3.1: Comparison of probability for successful Trojan detection.
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i+ 1) and thus the Trojan effect will not affect the normal test output collected through the
bottom tier, as shown in Figs. 3.3(b) and (c).
As the Trojan payload is located on Tier i, we examine whether the conventional 2D
and TSV-based 3D Trojans can be detected by the single-tier testing performed before, at
and after Tier i. As compared in the column 3 of Table 3.1, the single-tier testing cannot
detect most of the TSV-based Trojan and can successful identify the conventional Trojan
if the testing tier is at or after Tier i. We further derive the PSTD for each category. To
visualize our theoretical derivation of PSTD, we set N to 4 and swept the location of the
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Figure 3.4: Normalized Trojan detection probability comparison between conventional and
TSV-based Trojans.
conventional and TSV-based Trojans in the 3D structure. We assume the set of input stimuli
in each testing is the same. After normalizing the factor P , we plot the PSTD for each case
in Fig. 3.4. As can be seen, the normalized PSTD for the proposed TSV-based Trojan is
always lower than that for the conventional Trojan. This theoretical analysis result confirms
that TSV-woBR and TSV-wBR HTs are more difficult to detect if we execute the single-tier
testing.
PSTD Obtained by Two-Tier Testing
To address the limitation of the single-tier testing on the TSV-based Trojan detection, we
analyze the Trojan detection efficiency of two-tier testing, which activate two 3D tiers si-
multaneously during testing. As shown in Fig. 3.5(a), a test target frame (denoted by the
orange dash line) covering Tiers i and i + 1 can detect the TSV-based Trojan across Tiers
i and i + 1. When we set the test target frame at a higher tier location i + 1 and i + 2,
the two-tier testing detects the TSV-woBR Trojan, as shown in Fig. 3.5(b). However, for
the TSV-wBR Trojan in Fig. 3.5(c), setting the test target frame higher will fail the Trojan
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.5: Two-tier testing on TSV-based Trojans. (a) Setting test target at Tiers i and
i + 1 detects TSV-based Trojan. Setting test target at Tiers i + 1 and i + 2 (b) detects
TSV-woBR Trojan but (c) fails in detecting TSV-wBR Trojan.
detection because the payload cannot be activated. The conceptual comparison shown in
Fig. 3.5 indicates that TSV-wBR Trojan is more difficult to detect than TSV-woBR Trojan
in two-tier testing.
We summarize the detection outputs for different test target frame locations in the column
4 of Table 3.1. The corresponding PSTD for each Trojan type is listed in the column 6. Since
conventional Trojans are not our focus in this paper, we do not omit the detection output or
PSTD for the conventional Trojan case. We vary the number of tiers N from 2 to 10 and plot
the theoretical PSTD improvement achieved by the two-tier testing in Fig. 3.6. As shown,
the improved PSTD for TSV-woBR Trojan will drop when N increases. This indicates that
the advantage of two-tier testing in TSV-woBR Trojan detection may be more obvious for
the 3D chips that have relatively fewer tiers. However, because the single tier testing cannot
detect TSV-wBR Trojans, the improved PSTD for TSV-wBR Trojan will always be 100%.
We further investigate the impact of Trojan insertion location on PSTD. We assume a
3D IC has 6 tiers, the PSTD results for all the possible Trojan insertion locations are listed
in Table 3.2. We assumed three scenarios where attackers insert Trojans differently. In
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Figure 3.6: Improved Trojan detection probability by two-tier activation scheme.
Table 3.2: Comparison of PSTD Achieved by Single- and Two-tier Testing.




Single-tier testing 0.83P 0.67P 0.5P 0.33P 0.17P 0.5P 0.42P 0.59P
Two-tier testing P 0.8P 0.6P 0.4P 0.2P 0.6P 0.5P 0.71P
TSV-wBR
Single-tier testing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Two-tier testing 0.2P 0.2P 0.2P 0.2P 0.2P 0.2P 0.2P 0.2P
the scenario of Even, we assume attackers randomly choose a Trojan insertion location. In
Linear, attackers prefer to insert a Trojan in the higher tiers. In Normal, attackers prefer to
place a Trojan in the middle tiers. In different scenarios, the probabilities of inserting the
Trojan in each location (i=1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) are different. As shown in Fig. 3.7, the two-tier
testing improves the PSTD in all scenarios. In summary, our analysis confirms that two-tier
testing is superior to single-tier testing in the sense of TSV-based Trojan detection, if the
same test input stimuli is applied in the testing.
3.4 Proposed Two-Tier Activation (T2A) Testing Enhancement Method
The theoretical analysis in Section 3.3.2 indicates that activating two neighboring tiers si-
multaneously in the testing can significantly improve the probability of successfully detecting
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Figure 3.7: Improved Trojan detection probability by two-tier activation scheme.
TSV-based Trojans. Thus, we propose a two-tier activation (T2A) testing architecture to
enable the detection of both TSV-woBR and TSV-wBR hardware Trojans.
3.4.1 Overview of T2A Method
As shown in Fig. 3.8, the testing frame for our Trojan detection method is an enhancement
over what IEEE Std 1838 uses (as shown in Fig. 3.1). In T2A, we add a position deter-
mination module (PDM) to each tier. It takes the bypass register values from its current
tier and its previous tier as inputs and reports the current tier’s position in the test frame.
We further induce an extra TSV, BR-TSV, between every two neighboring tiers to transmit
bypass register values. Based on the different positions determined by PDMs, the tiers will
have different data paths during a test. In this way, PDM takes over the role of the bypass
register in IEEE Std 1838 to decide which tiers are bypassed or activated in the ongoing
testing. More specifically, the data flow inside test frame ensures the test input is given to
the top-half tier (Tier 2 in Fig. 3.8) in the frame and the test output is from the top-half tier
as well. This is because the payload in the bottom-half tier (Tier 1 in Fig. 3.8) will flip the
incoming TSV signals from Tier 2, once the test input given to Tier 2 satisfies the triggering
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Figure 3.8: Proposed T2A method in detecting TSV-based Trojans.
condition of the trigger logic there. The corrupted test output from Tier 2 will be passed
to I/O ports and the Trojan is detected. There is no need to test the logic function of the
bottom-half tier even though it is in the test frame.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates an example of the proposed T2A method successfully detecting
the TSV-based Trojan. The test frame currently includes the bottom two tiers of a 3D IC.
When a test begins, the PDM in each tier of the 3D IC reads in the bypass register values
and determines the tier’s position. Note, the PDM in bottom tier only needs the bypass
register value from its current to determine the position. The test input coming into the
test frame will bypass Tier 1 and directly reach Tier 2, the top-half tier of test frame. The
logic of Tier 2 will be tested and the test output is then passed back to Tier 1. During this
process, the Trojan trigger in Tier 2 will be activated by the test input and the triggered
payload in Tier 1 will flip the text output from Tier 2. The corrupted test output then can
be observed in I/O ports. The data flow in the test described above follows the order labeled
in Fig. 3.8.
3.4.2 Place Determination Module (PDM)
The logic defined in the PDM can derive which tier is being tested. A PDM works as a look
up table (LUT) which takes the bypass register values from the current tier (BR Pre) and
the previous tier (BR Curr) as inputs and controls the DWRs to conduct different data
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Table 3.3: The Number of Clock Cycles Needed in TSV-woBR Trojan detection.
Trojan1 Trojan2 Trojan3 Trojan4 Trojan5 Average Reduced detection time
2 tiers
IEEE Std 1838 56 34 41 43 55 45.8
68%
T2A 25 3 10 12 24 14.8
3 tiers
IEEE Std 1838
Trojan in tiers 1 and 2 56 34 41 43 55
61.3
51%
Trojan in tiers 2 and 3 87 65 72 74 86
T2A
Trojan in tiers 1 and 2 25 3 10 12 24
30.3
Trojan in tiers 2 and 3 56 34 41 43 55
4 tiers
IEEE Std 1838
Trojan in tiers 1 and 2 56 34 41 43 55
76.8
40%
Trojan in tiers 2 and 3 87 65 72 74 86
Trojan in tiers 3 and 4 118 96 103 105 117
T2A
Trojan in tiers 1 and 2 25 3 10 12 24
45.8Trojan in tiers 2 and 3 56 34 41 43 55
Trojan in tiers 3 and 4 87 65 72 74 86
Table 3.4: The Number of Clock Cycles Needed in TSV-wBR Trojan Detection.
Trojan 1 Trojan 2 Trojan 3 Trojan 4 Trojan 5 Average
c17
IEEE Std 1838 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
T2A 25 3 10 12 24 14.8
c432
IEEE Std 1838 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
T2A 122 16 61 158 195 110.4
c880
IEEE Std 1838 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
T2A 31 43 116 28 30 49.6
paths based on its output. If we assume the bypass register value of a tier is zero if the tier
is under test currently. The key logic of the PDM is specified in Table 3.5. If the a tier
is determined as the top-half tier of test frame, the DWRs of it will direct the test input
to the logic core and send the test output from the logic core to the bottom-half tier. If a
tier is determined as the bottom-half tier, its DWRs will directly relay the test input to the
top-half tier instead of letting it entering the logic core. The DWRs will also pass the test
output from top-half tier to their next neighboring tier. For the tiers that are outside of the
test frame, they only play a role of relaying test input and output data.
3.5 Experimental Results
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented the proposed T2A method and use a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA platform to
emulate the 3D structure. We assume each tier of the 3D ICs tested in our experiments has
the same circuitry. ISCAS’85 circuits c17, c432 and c880 are used as benchmarks to configure
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the 3D tiers. For example, one emulated 3D IC in our experiments has 3 tiers and each one
is configured using a benchmark circuit. Two levels of TSV-based Trojans are inserted to the
3D ICs. Because our TSV-based Trojan focuses on modifying the behavior-level function of
3D ICs, it is not necessary to create a device-level 3D IC for the emulation. In this way, we
create a logic module for each 3D tier and map them all in one FPGA device. The modules
are connected using wires to simulate TSVs. The Trojans are inserted to two of the modules
and an extra wire is induced to simulate the Trojan TSV. The effectiveness and efficiency
of the proposed T2A method is examined and compared with the baseline version of IEEE
Std 1838. Furthermore, the area and delay overhead induced by T2A method is evaluated
in the Xilinx ISE and PlanAhead software, respectively.
3.5.2 Trojan Detection Speed
TSV-woBR Trojans
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the improvement on the PSTD for TSV-woBR Trojans depends
on the number of tiers in the 3D IC, we examine the number of clock cycles needed to detect
the Trojan that is inserted in one of the 2-tier, 3-tier, and 4-tier stacked 3D ICs. The original
IEEE Std 1838 and the proposed T2A method were adopted in the testing. For the cases
where the 3D ICs have 3 or 4 tiers, the Trojan could be inserted to different locations within
a 3D stack. We considered all possible Trojan locations and ran the Trojan detection on each
case with 5 trials. Each trial represents a unique triggering condition, which will consume a
unique period of time for Trojan triggering. As shown in Table 3.3, our T2A method reduces
the time spent on the TSV-woBR Trojan detection by 68%, 51%, and 40% for the 2-tier,
3-tier, and 4-tier 3D cases, respectively, compared to IEEE Std 1838. The improvement will
be slightly degraded with the increase of the number of tiers, which is consistent with the
predicted improvement on the Trojan detection probability shown in Fig. 3.6. If we increase
the number of tiers in the test frame, this limitation can be addressed.
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Table 3.5: Logic Table Defined in PDM
BR Pre BR Curr Location in two-tier testing unit
0 0 Top-half
0 1 Out of frame
1 0 Bottom-half
1 1 Out of frame
TSV-wBR Trojans
Our proposed T2A method outperforms the original IEEE Std 1838 as T2A can successfully
detect TSV-wBR Trojans. In the experiments presented in this subsection, we fixed the
Trojan insertion location and varied the benchmark circuit (c17, c432, and c880) in our
testing. The time consumed by different Trojan detection methods is shown in Table 3.4.
As the original IEEE Std 1838 fails in detecting any Trojans inserted in the experiments, the
execution time is denoted as ‘n/a’ in Table 3.4. In contrast, the proposed method succeeds
in all the test cases, and the number of clock cycles needed for Trojan detection depends on
the size of the benchmark circuit deployed in the 3D tiers.
3.5.3 Overhead Evaluation
The proposed T2A method modifies the original testing algorithm defined in the IEEE Std
1838. Instead of performing the testing on each tier, our method is able to activate two
neighboring tiers per testing. More specifically, the method always returns the test output
from the tier that is located at the top-half of the test frame. This means the bottom tier of a
3D stack will never need to be checked for test output. Comparing to the original IEEE Std
1838, the proposed T2A is expected to induce less overhead. The overhead on hardware cost
is evaluated in Xilinx ISE. As shown in Fig. 3.9, T2A indeed consumes less FPGA resources
than IEEE Std 1838. The delay overhead is measured by Xilinx PlanAhead software and
compared in Fig. 3.10. As we can see, our method reduces the delay overhead by 12.03%,




Figure 3.9: Hardware cost comparison in (a) utilized slice LUTs and (b) occupied slices in
FPGA.
3.6 Conclusion
Due to the unique structure and complicated testing environment of 3D ICs, it is more
complicated and difficult to detect 3D hardware Trojans than the conventional Trojans in
2D chips. This chapter proposes TSV-based hardware Trojans in 3D ICs. We perform
theoretical analysis on the probability of successful Trojan detection under the testing frame
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Figure 3.10: Delay overhead comparison.
defined by IEEE Std 1838, and reveal the limitation of single-tier testing on 3D Trojan
detection. Furthermore, we further propose a T2A enhancement method to improve the test
frame of the IEEE Std 1838, thus achieving better 3D Trojan detection rate and consuming
less Trojan detection time. Our experimental results show that the proposed method can
successfully detect the TSV-based Trojans and reduce up to 68% of detection time compared
to the original IEEE Std 1838.
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CHAPTER 4
FTAI: Frequency-based Trojan-Activity Identification Method for 3D
Integrated Circuits
4.1 Introduction
Existing Trojan-detection methods are mostly proposed for conventional 2D ICs. Their de-
tection effect might be degraded in a 3D environment. For example, functional-verification
based methods may not work well in 3D scenarios. First, the larger number of transistors in-
tegrated into the 3D package makes the exhaustive functional verification more sophisticated
and time-consuming. Moreover, the limited probing capabilities do not allow us to simul-
taneously access all die-to-die vertical communication channels for thorough testing neither.
Side-channel based Trojan detection is commonly used in securing 2D ICs. However, be-
cause 3D ICs usually have more internal noise than 2D ICs, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
of the side-channel signals for detection will be reduced noticeably. Larger variations on
the process, voltage, and temperature in 3D ICs further lead to a higher false-positive rate.
Thus, it is more challenging to precisely extract Trojan’s impact on side-channel indicators
or/and functional behaviors in the 3D scenarios [6].
To facilitate side-channel based Trojan detection in 3D ICs, it is imperative to develop
a new method to tolerate the interference from 3D noise. In this chapter, we propose a
Frequency-based Trojan-Activity Identification (FTAI) to detect 3D Trojans. Our FTAI
method tolerates 3D noise and achieves a high Trojan detection rate. Comparing to the
existing frequency-based detection methods, such as [53], FTAI takes process variation into
consideration and provides a new way of threshold generation without using a fabricated
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golden chip. Our theoretical analyses verify that the Trojan effect is more differentiable
in the frequency spectrum than in timing waveform, no matter it acts as an additive or
multiplicative noise. The experimental results further show that FTAI increases the Trojan
detection rate by 38.1% compared to the time-domain detection method.
4.2 Trojan Model
3D hardware Trojans are characterized in Chapter 2 and the recent work [9]. In this chapter,
we aim to detect the cross-tier hardware Trojan in 3D ICs. The goal of the 3D Trojan is to
leak the secret key of a crypto unit implemented in the middle tier. The trigger is located
in the same tier as the crypto unit while the payload is in the top tier. The trigger and
payload circuits are inserted in two different single-die fabrication phases. According to the
cross-tier hardware Trojan model in Chapter 2 and [9], the Trojan is not functioning during
the single-tier testing stage but will be triggered after all 3D tiers are assembled.
We extend the MOLES Trojan [46], which is modeled for 2D ICs, to a 3D version. MOLES
is composed of a set of registers as a ring generator to produce a series of random numbers,
which will be XORed with the crypto key. The XOR outputs drive a set of capacitors as the
Trojan payload. Attackers who know the implementation details of the ring generator can
decode the obfuscated key information via power analysis. However, the power consumed in
the load capacitors seems like noise if the random sequence is unknown. To form a cross-tier
Trojan, the trigger and the ring generator of MOLES are inserted in the middle tier of our
transistor-level 3D chip. The crypto unit, an AES Sbox, is located in the middle tier as well.
The crypto key for AES will be leaked with eight capacitors. More details are available in
Section 4.5.1.
4.3 Limitation of Time-domain Analysis based Trojan Detection
Time-domain analysis on the transient current of the circuit under Trojan attacks could
reveal the presence of hardware Trojans, which contribute to more/less current. The effi-
49
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Time-domain analysis for Trojan detection. (a) Transient currents for three
test cases, (b) Success/Failure of Trojan detection.
ciency of time-domain analysis heavily depends on the difference between the Trojan-induced
current change and pre-existing inherent noise. A smaller difference leads to a higher false-
positive/negative detection rate. Figure 4.1(a) shows the timing waveform for the transient
current measured from our transistor-level 3D chip. The current was collected from the
power-supply pin of the chip. The TrojanFree line in the graph represents a basic 3D chip.
The TrojanIn line indicates the current after the injected Trojan is triggered. We further
introduced process variation to the TrojanFree case to create noise margins, which are high-
lighted by the yellow area. As shown in Fig. 4.1(a), the impact of Trojans on the transient
current does not exceed the boundaries defined by the noise for most of the time. If we
consider the cases in which the TrojanIn line goes beyond the noise margin as the success of
Trojan detection, the detection output is shown in Fig. 4.1(b). A very small portion of the
line reaches True (i.e., detected) and the overall success detection rate is only 16.98%.
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4.4 Proposed Frequency-based Trojan-activity Identification (FTAI) for 3D Hard-
ware Trojans
4.4.1 Overview of Proposed FTAI Method
As 3D integration techniques bring in new security threats to ICs, it is imperative to develop
effective Trojan detection methods for 3D chips. Since time-domain Trojan analysis methods
suffer from noise interference, we explore new methods performed in the frequency domain.
In this chapter, we propose a frequency-based Trojan-activity identification (FTAI) method,
which exploits the frequency spectrum of the transient current of a 3D chip under Trojan
attacks to detect hardware Trojans. We follow the footprint of the work [53] but specifi-
cally tailor the detection method for 3D ICs, which are known to have more variation on
process/voltage/temperature and internal noise. Different than the work [53], our method
waives the assumption on the frequency band of potential Trojans and the independence
between primary circuits and Trojans. Furthermore, we propose a new threshold generation
algorithm to achieve a high Trojan detection rate and reduce the false-positive rate over the
existing work.
4.4.2 Theoretical Analysis
First, we assume that IPrime and IHT represent for the transient current contributed by the
primary circuit and hardware Trojan, respectively. If the Trojan is an extra circuit that is
independent of the primary circuit (i.e., victim module), we can model the total current for
the circuit suffering from the Trojan attack with the expression shown in Eq. (4.1).
Itot = IPrime + IHT + n(t)
= APrimesin(2πfPrimet) + AHT sin(2πfHT t) + n(t)
(4.1)
In which, APrime and fPrime represent the amplitude and frequency for IPrime. Similarly,










































Figure 4.2: Frequency spectrum of (a)Itot and (b) Itotmul .
functions to model the current components since most kinds of signals in nature can be
modeled with a format of sinusoids [54]. The term n(t) is white noise.
After Fourier Transformation, we will observe that the frequency spectrum F(Itot) in-
cludes three kinds of frequency components as shown in Eq. (4.2). Because the frequency
response of the white noise is a constant value approximately, we use C to substitute F(n(t)).
The corresponding spectrum for F(Itot) is shown in Fig. 4.2(a). Different than the frequency
response of noise, which is flat at the bottom of the entire spectrum, the Trojan activity will




[δ(f − fPrime) + δ(f + fPrime)]+
AHT
2i
[δ(f − fHT ) + δ(f + fHT )] + C
(4.2)
In addition to the additive influence on the total current, the current contribution from
the hardware Trojan can be modeled as a multiplicative component if the Trojan is inserted
by performing malicious modifications to the primary circuit. We formulate the total current
Itotmul in Eq. (4.3). After performing the Fourier transformation on Itotmul , we can obtain the
frequency-domain expression for the total current F(Itotmul), which is expressed in Eq. (4.4).
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{δ[f − (fPrime + fHT )]+
δ[f − (fPrime − fHT )] + δ[f − (−fPrime + fHT )]+
δ[f − (−fPrime − fHT )]}+ C
(4.4)
Because multiplication in the time domain is transformed to convolution in the frequency
domain, the frequency of the primary current will have an offset induced by the Trojan. Fig-
ure 4.2(b) shows the spectra of F(Itotmul) and primary signal together. We can see the
frequency of the primary signal is shifted by the Trojan. In conclusion, our theoretical
analysis indicates that the impact of Trojans on the frequency spectrum can be easily differ-
entiated from white noise. This motivates us to propose a frequency-based detection method
for 3D Trojans.
4.4.3 Detection Flow
The detection flow for the proposed FTAI method is composed of three phases: preliminary
Trojan inspection, reference threshold generation, and final scrutinization. Figure 4.3 depicts
the detailed detection flow.
In the phase of the preliminary Trojan inspection, one needs to collect the total transient
current of the 3D chip from the power-supply pin. Then, Fourier transformation is utilized
to convert the time-domain current trace to its frequency-domain representation Freal. Next,
the same process is repeated on the transistor-level 3D model for the same 3D chip to obtain
Fsim. The two frequency spectra Freal and Fsim are compared to identify the suspicious
frequency band FHT , in which the Trojan may be located. This process will minimize
the noise interference on Trojan detection, as discussed in Section 4.4.2. We performed a
simulation to compare the frequency spectra for the current trace of the golden model (i.e.,
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Figure 4.3: Trojan detection flow proposed in our FTAI method.
clean without noise and Trojan), noisy model (i.e., noise induced by process variation is
considered), and Trojan-infected model (i.e., the triggered Trojan leaks information). As
shown in Fig. 4.4, the Trojan results in a new frequency peak on the lower frequency band
than the primary signal. The zoom-in view of that frequency peak indicates that the Trojan
introduces a more substantial magnitude difference than the process variation noise. To
facilitate Trojan scrutinization in the following phases, we define a metric, named peak
distance (PD), to quantify the difference in frequency magnitude between the first frequency
peak induced by the Trojan and the corresponding response from the reference model.
After the preliminary Trojan inspection, a reference threshold will be applied to further
examine the suspicious frequency band. As golden chips are often unavailable in practical
situations, the reference threshold is provided based on simulations [55]. In this work, we
apply different process variations to our transistor-level reference and obtain the correspond-
ing frequency spectra. In each spectrum, we measure the peak distance against Fsim in the
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of frequency spectra for baseline, noisy, and Trojan impacted cases.
frequency band FHT . We denote the group of the peak-distance values for all the cases as
PDnoise. It is used to evaluate the magnitude changes induced by noise on FHT . To achieve
a high confidence, we apply the 3σ value of the signal PDnoise as the threshold PDth to our
Trojan detection method. The closed-form expression for PDth is available in Eq. (5), where
µ and σ are the mean and the standard deviation of PDnoise.
PDth = µ+ 3σ = Mean(PDnoise) + 3Std(PDnoise) (4.5)
In the phase of final scrutinization, the peak distance of the chip under examination is
compared with the threshold generated in the previous phase. If the peak distance exceeds




We evaluated the proposed method by using transistor-level simulations. A stacked 3D IC
with three tiers is implemented in a 45nm NCSU FreePDK technology [56]. The PDN in each
tier is mainly composed of a global power grid and a virtual grid. The local load circuits
in each tier are multiple inverters. In our experiments, the target of the MOLES Trojan
(described in Section 4.2) is an AES Sbox implemented at transistor level. We provided the
input vectors satisfying the triggering condition of 3D MOLES Trojans to leak the crypto
key during our experiments. We collected the transient current trace for a period of 80ns
from the power-supply pin of the transistor-level 3D chip and converted the time-domain
current traces to frequency spectra. We repeated the same procedure for the models of
Trojan-free (i.e., reference), Trojan-free but considering different process variation noise (i.e.,
noise), Trojan-injected at the nominal process variation (i.e. Trojan), and Trojan-injected
in different process variation cases.
4.5.2 Impact of Trojan size on Trojan Detection
All the experiments in this subsection were based on the nominal process variation. We
first compared the proposed detection metric peak distance in the frequency domain, with
Euclidean distance in the time domain. We performed the proposed spectrum analysis and
identified the Trojan-related frequency peak in 75MHz. Peak distance for three Trojan sizes
(MOLES20, MOLES40, and MOLES80) was measured. MOLES20 means that there are 20
registers in the MOLES ring generator. As shown in Table 4.1, the proposed peak distance
is always 30× higher than Euclidean distance. This means the proposed frequency-domain
analysis method can better tolerate the measurement errors and noise interference than the
time-domain Trojan detection. We applied the seven process corners to the reference chip
and collected their corresponding peak distance to form the group PDnoise. After following
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Table 4.1: Trojan detection metrics used in frequency-domain and time-domain analysis
methods.
Metrics w.r.t Trojan size MOLES20 MOLES40 MOLES80
Euclidean distance 0.0899 0.1831 0.6049
Proposed peak distance 2.986 7.367 24.007
Improved distance 33.2× 40.2× 39.7×
the procedure introduced in Section 4.4.3, we obtained its 3σ value of 1.578 for our frequency-
domain Trojan analysis. As all measured peak distance values are greater than 1.578, our
method can detect all three Trojans. In contrast, the 3σ value for the time-domain Trojan
analysis is 0.1521, which is higher than the Euclidean distance for MOLES20. Thus, the
time-domain Trojan detection fails in the MOLES20 case.
4.5.3 Impact of Process Variation on Trojan Detection
We further evaluated the impact of process variation on the Trojan detection success rate of
our method. We conducted different test cases by applying seven process variation configu-
rations to our 3D structure. The seven corners are sss (the slowest), ss, ns, nom, nf, ff, and
fff (the fastest). The sss (fff ) case doubles the progress variation from nom to ss (ff ). The
ns (nf ) case is the half variation step from nom to ss (ff ). The main variations include the
long channel threshold voltage, gate oxide thickness, channel length offset, first-order body
effect coefficient, and low-field mobility. As shown in Fig. 4.5(a), the peak distance of the
3D circuit tampered by Trojans with different sizes is consistently larger than the threshold,
which means all the Trojans can be detected and the Trojan detection rate achieved by our
method is 100%. The results shown in Fig. 4.5(b) represent the Euclidean distance obtained
by the time-domain analysis method. As can be seen, the Euclidean distance for the case of
MOLES20 is always below the threshold (except the fff corner). The time-domain analysis
based Trojan detection also fails to detect MOLES40 in the sss and ss cases. We calculated
that the time-domain method yields a 61.9% of Trojan detection rate. Thus, our proposed




Figure 4.5: Trojan detection effectiveness comparison between (a) frequency-domain method
and (b) time-domain method at different noise levels.
4.6 Conclusion
3D IC is considered as a promising solution for future integration. However, the stacking
structure and complicated fabrication process give adversaries a chance to perform malicious
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attacks. Unexplored 3D Hardware Trojans can be inserted in the supply chain. Very limited
works about 3D Trojan’s detection and mitigation can be found in the current literature.
We proposed an FTAI, which can better tolerate 3D noise than the time-domain detection
method to provide a better detection rate on 3D hardware Trojans. The experimental results
show that FTAI achieved a 100% detection rate on the 3D-version of MOLES. Comparing
to the time-domain method, FTAI improved the detection rate by 38.1%.
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CHAPTER 5
Invariance Checking based Trojan Detection Method for Three-Dimensional
Integrated Circuits
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a run-time Trojan detection and mitigation method to com-
plement the existing countermeasures against 2D and 3D hardware Trojans. Our main
contributions are as follows: (1) our method proposes to leverage the 3D communication
infrastructure, 3D-Network-on-chips (3D-NoCs), to tackle the cross-tier hardware Trojans
in stacked multi-tier chips, and (2) an invariance checking method is proposed to detect
Trojans, which introduce malicious NoC packets or facilitate information leak among 3D
tiers.
The rest of this chapter is organized as below. Section 5.2 presents the attack model
interested in this work. Section 5.3 proposes a novel invariance checking method to thwart
3D Trojan insertion attacks. Simulation and synthesis results are provided in Section 5.4.
This work is concluded in Section 5.5.
5.2 Attack Model
The models for representable 3D hardware Trojans are introduced in Chapter 2 and the recent
work [9]. The most significant difference between 3D hardware Trojans and conventional 2D
hardware Trojans is that the trigger and payload circuits of 3D Trojans are not located in
the same 3D tier. Figure 5.1(a) shows examples of Cross-Tier Trojans. In the left case,




Figure 5.1: Attack scenarios considered in this work. (a) Characterization of 3D hardware
Trojans, and (b) an example of the activated 3D Trojan effect [1].
payload in the bottom tier. This triggering mechanism can have a much lower triggering
probability than the Trojan trigger in a single tier. In the right case, neither the trigger nor
the payload circuit is located in the same tier where the victim remains; the data transmission
between victims is leaked due to the Trojan in the middle tier. This type of Trojans does
not interrupt normal data communication. If 3D hardware Trojans described in Fig. 5.1(a)
are placed in a 3D-NoC system shown in Fig. 5.1(b), that system may suffer from livelock
and information leak [1]. In this chapter, we analyze the characteristics of these two types
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of 3D Trojans and propose a mitigation method accordingly.
Our 3D Trojan detection and mitigation method is based on the following assumptions:
(1) each tier is a completed die (rather than a die appeared in the middle of split manufac-
turing), (2) the communication between tiers is at IP core level, rather than functional block
level, and (3) the routing rule used in 3D routers is public to attackers.
5.3 Proposed Invariance Checking Based 3D Hardware Trojan Detection and
Mitigation
5.3.1 Proposed Hardened Router Architecture for 3D-NoCs
Cross-tier hardware Trojans (or multi-tier collaborative Trojans) emerge as a new hardware
Trojan model for 3D ICs. Due to 3D hardware Trojans’ unique threat characterizations,
it is a pressing need to investigate new detection and mitigation methods specifically for
3D hardware Trojans. Moreover, the countermeasures against 3D hardware Trojans are
expected to be compatible with the architecture of 3D systems. The defense mechanism
should be integrated into the system specification, rather than an add-on component patched
afterwards.
We propose to tackle cross-tier Trojans with a router-hardened 3D-NoC, which is the
communication backbone for 3D integrated circuits and systems. The proposed security
mechanism complements to the investigation on other 3D-NoC aspects (thermal issue [57],
architecture [58], and usage in computationally intensive applications [59]). As 3D IC testing
is not as thorough as 2D IC verification, there will be residual hardware Trojans, especially
cross-tier Trojans, harming 3D systems after testing [9]. To address this issue, we propose a
run-time Trojan detection and mitigation method against cross-tier hardware Trojans.
Figure 5.2(a) shows the architecture of proposed 3D router, in which the five ports
PTNORTH , PTSOUTH , PTWEST , PTEAST and PTLOCAL are used for the intra-tier communi-
cation, and PTU and PTD are responsible for transferring data to the upper and lower tiers,




Figure 5.2: Proposed cross-tier Trojan detection. (a) Proposed router architecture for 3D-
NoC, and (b) block diagram of vertical port PTU/D protected with invariance checking based
hardware firewall.
an invariance checking based hardware firewall, to thwart unauthorized access to the other
router ports and prevent 3D-NoCs from sniffing attacks. The zoom-in view for the proposed
RWall is illustrated in Fig. 5.2(b). The RWall 1○ examines whether a NoC flit (i.e., a basic
flow unit in NoCs [45]) is tampered during its propagation from other tiers. Such tampering
could be induced due to malicious through-silicon-vias (TSVs) or compromised input FIFOs.
The RWall 2○ terminates the requests from PTU/D to use other ports. The RWall 3○ moni-
tors the duplication of malicious NoC packets among multiple output ports. The combined
effect of 2○ and 3○ blocks the illegal information leak and prevents the 3D communication
infrastructure from being tampered at the router level.
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Figure 5.3: Proposed invariance checking in NoC router.
5.3.2 Proposed Invariance Checking within NoC Router
Invariance checking is a cost-effective method for fault tolerance within NoC [60]. Following
that footprint, we propose to leverage the invariance within 3D-NoCs to tackle cross-tier
hardware Trojans. In this subsection, we first examine the suitable invariance at the flit,
port, and router levels and then develop a practical implementation algorithm. Figure 5.3
provides the detailed view of a hardened NoC router. A typical router for 2D-NoCs consists of
five bi-directional routing ports, each of which is composed of input/output FIFOs, a routing
computation, a crossbar (XBar), and an arbiter. For 3D-NoCs, up-stream and down-stream
ports (PTU/D) are added to access other 3D tiers. Global invariance checking examines any
violation of port access among seven bi-directional NoC router ports. As our defense target
is cross-tier Trojans, we pay extra attention to PTU/D by adding local invariance checking.
The complete Trojan detection and mitigation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. More
precisely, the proposed algorithm is implemented at the flit, port, and router levels.
At flit level, tampered flits (router inputs) will be detected by the Units for Integrity
Check (UIC). Error control coding (ECC) is a common low-cost approach for data integrity
detection. We propose to use two-level ECC based integrity check as expressed in Equa-
tions (5.1) and (5.2). In addition to encode/decode the entire flit, limited configurations of
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critical flit fields will be encoded for another level integrity check.
UICalert1 = DecFun1(Flit) (5.1)
In which, Flit is a tuple of {flit type, flit source, flit destination, hopping path, routing
priority, parity check}.
UICalert2 = DecFun2(flittype, fieldsel, parity2nd) (5.2)
Where, flittype indicates whether the flit is a header or payload, fieldsel is several selected
fields for second-level integrity check (e.g., flit source and destination), parity2nd is the second
level coding algorithm for integrity check. The two alert signals UICalert1 and UICalert2 from
UIC will stop the malicious flit from entering or leaving the suspicious router port.
At port level, the invariance for Trojan detection includes illegal port requests and mis-
matched control-data flows. Only a header flit can request to reserve port-to-port connection.
Any port-requests issued from other flits indicate Trojan intrusion. Since port-to-port com-
munication is exclusive, each output port can accept one and only one request from all other
input ports in the same router. Likewise, an input port cannot simultaneously issue multiple
requests to access more than two output ports. Another invariance is originated from the
routing history. The incoming and outgoing port request (RCreq) should match to packet
source (SRID), destination (DRID) and the current router IDs (CRID). The routing
inverse function expressed in Eq.(5.3) facilitates the detection of tampered routing history.
Localinvar = RInverse(SRID,DRID,CRID,RCreq) (5.3)
As the information regarding the complete routing path varies with different NoC applica-
tions, the hardware Trojans inserted in 3D-NoC design time is not able to bypass all of the
routing consistency check. Moreover, the invariance rules mentioned above are not mutable
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Algorithm 1: Proposed multi-level invariance check.
Data: Packets through a 3D-NoC router
Result: Alert for 3D Trojan intrusion
1 UICalert1 (Input flits);
2 UICalert2 (Selective flit breakdown fields);
3 while Cross-tier packets being transferred do














9 Intrusion attack detected;
10 Terminate cross-tier communication;
11 else
12 //Global invariance checking;
13 if RInverse outputs mismatch RCreq then
14 Intrusion attack detected;
15 Drop malicious flits;
16 else




21 Use encryption key to unlock arbiter tables;
22 end
once the router is power up. Thus, our invariance checking does not only detect malfunctions
but also monitors illegal behaviors triggered by 3D hardware Trojans.
At router level, our method examines the invariance available among arbiters. In the
baseline, the arbiter grants one of the port requests based on even opportunity (i.e., round
robin rule). Updating on the round-robin register tables has to satisfy the priority rule.
Any interrupts appeared in the middle of packet transmission indicates the occurrence of an
attack. Logic encryption [61] is adopted to harden the round-robin tables. In our case study,
we use a 7-bit key to unlock the updating logic for arbiters in 3D routers. The incorrect
encryption key will terminate the arbiter’s normal function.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Area, Delay and Power
Metric under comparison Baseline [8] Proposed Overhead
Area (µm2) 19731 21005 6.46%
Delay (ns) 0.86 0.94 9.30%
Dynamic power (mW) 13.0733 13.5646 3.76%
Leakage power (µW) 108.0194 115.6355 7.05%
5.4 Experimental Results
5.4.1 Area, Power, and Delay
We implemented the proposed 3D NoC router in Verilog HDL and synthesized the HDL code
in Synopsys Design Compiler with a 45nm NCSU openPDK technology. The flit width for
the NoC is 32 bits. The input and output FIFOs are 32-bit single-depth buffers. Round-robin
arbitration was used in the router arbiter. We set the clock frequency to 1 GHz. The area,
delay and power consumption for the baseline [8] and our method are compared in Table 5.1.
As shown, our method is a lightweight countermeasure. The area is only increased by 6.49%.
The overhead on dynamic power and leakage power are 3.76% and 7.05%, respectively. As
we add invariance checking in the cross-bar unit, the worst-case delay of our router is 9.3%
higher than that of the baseline.
5.4.2 Trojan Detection Rate
The proposed invariance checking examines the consistency between the port requests and
the routing history to detect 3D hardware Trojans. We randomly altered the port request to
access upper and lower tiers (i.e., attack on router port requests) or the destination router ID
carried in the NoC header flit (i.e. attack on destination router ID). Each Trojan detection
rate was obtained from 10,000 simulations. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the Trojan detection rate
of our method is above 94%, no matter the Trojan attack is on the port request signals or
the destination router ID.
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Attack on router port request
Attack on destination router ID
Figure 5.4: Trojan detection rate of proposed method.
5.4.3 Impact of Cross-tier Trojan Mitigation on Image Authentication in a 3D system
In our case study, we used a 3D-NoC to perform image based authentication. The experimen-
tal setup is shown in Fig. 5.5(a). Through the 3D NoC routers, tier 1 and tier 2 transmit two
images to tier 3 for image authentication. Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) is adopted
as the metric to indicate whether the two images from tiers 1 and 2 depict the same person.
Hardware Trojan insertion happens in the 3D router located in tier 2 or the TSVs connecting
tiers 2 and 3. The activated Trojan tampers the header flits or payload flits of the image
packets. The proposed method filters out the tampered flits. If a header flit is altered by a
3D hardware Trojan, the entire targeted packet is replaced by a malicious packet (baseline)
or dropped with notifications (proposed). If a payload flit is sabotaged by a 3D hardware
Trojan, only that flit is substituted by a dummy flit (baseline) or deleted (proposed) and
the rest flits in that packet remain the same. The PCC between images from tiers 1 and
2 are computed in the victim unit (i.e., Corr in Fig. 5.5(a)). As shown in Fig. 5.5(b) and
5.5(c), our scheme removes malicious flits significantly and thus reduces the correlation co-
efficient. This means that the tampered images are less likely to pass the authentication.
For instance, the proposed method can reduce the PCC from 0.6755 to 0.3122. As each
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Figure 5.5: Impact of Trojans on the application of 3D image authentication. (a) attack
scenario, (b) impact of attacking header flit on correlation coefficient, and (c) impact of
attacking payload flits on correlation coefficient.
NoC packet is composed of one header flit and multiple payload flits, the baseline scheme
is more sensitive to Trojan attacks aiming at header flits than at payload flits. In contrast,
our Trojan mitigation overcomes that sensitivity.
We examined the Trojan mitigation effect with six images shown in Fig. 5.5(a). Images
B, C, D, E, and F are correlated with image A (after Trojan detection and mitigation). As
shown in Fig. 5.6(a), the proposed method can reduce the PCC by 31%. As the percent
of tampered packets increases, our mitigation method will further reduce the correlation
coefficient. The exact amount of reduction on correlation coefficient varies with the images
used in authentication.
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Figure 5.6: Reduction on correlation coefficient achieved by Trojan mitigation.
5.5 Conclusion
The emerging 3D integration techniques potentially bring in attack surfaces for new type of
hardware Trojans, cross-tier 3D Trojans. Given the 3D Trojan models published in recent
literature, this chapter proposes to leverage 3D-NoC architecture to detect and mitigate
the newly characterized hardware Trojans. Invariance on port access and routing history is
exploited in this work to perform run-time Trojan detection. Simulation results show that




Improving Power Analysis Attack Resistance using Intrinsic Noise in 3D ICs
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our groups’s early work [2] by providing the second practical
implementation method to alter the power supply of complete AES crypto module in FPGA
and validate the correlation power analysis (CPA) attack resilience of our method. We
propose to group the supply voltages from different 3D tiers temporally to drive the cypto
module. In this way, the noise from 3D power distribution network (PDN) is induced to the
crypto module to blur the correlation exploited by CPA attacks. We name this new method
temporally varied supply voltage (TVSV).
6.2 Preliminary
6.2.1 Early Work of Using 3D PDN Noise to Mitigate CPA Attacks
In the work [2], the intrinsic noise within a 3D PDN has been proved to be additive noise.
Furthermore, a countermeasure which utilizes the PDN noise to mitigate CPA attacks is
introduced. As shown in Fig. 6.1, the original crypto unit is divided into multiple submod-
ules. The supply voltages, VDDs, from different 3D tiers are used to drive the submodules
individually. In this way, the noise from different tiers are induced to the crypto unit and
thus blur the power traces collected for CPA attacks.
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Figure 6.1: Countermeasure introduced in [2]
6.2.2 CPA Attack
CPA is an advanced power analysis attack for the crypto key retrieval from the hardware
implementation of encryption systems. It leverages the correlation between the crypto key
and the switching activities of the crypto hardware module to significantly shorten the time
spent on the key guessing via brute force attempts. In a CPA attack, attackers will calculate
the outputs of the encryption system and adopt Hamming distance/Hamming weight model
to generate hypothetical power consumption [13]. Then the Pearson correlation coefficient
(PCC) [62] is utilized to retrieve the secret key.
6.3 Proposed TVSV against CPA Attacks
6.3.1 Theoretical Foundation of TVSV





In which, α, f , CL, and VDD are switching activity factor, system clock frequency, load
capacitance, and supply voltage, respectively. If we vary the supply voltage temporally,
which means we change the supply voltage along with the time. The new power consumption
can be formed as in Eq. (6.2).
Pnew =
∑N
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In which, N is the number of different supply voltages changed during the time period of
interest. VDDi represents each different supply voltage. We can alter VDDi in a completely
or periodically random fashion. The latter one requires less number of diverse VDDis, but
it is less effective than the former method in regard to the resilience against CPA attacks.
Figure 6.2 shows the application of periodically random noise that helps to reduce the cor-
relation coefficient over the constant nominal supply voltage. The application of completely
random noise leads to an approximately flat PCC even though the variance of multiple noises
is in wide range.
6.3.2 Implementation of TVSV
We multiplex multiple voltage sources to power up the entire crypto unit, rather than mul-
tiple sub-units as what is proposed in [2]. As shown in Fig. 6.3, the four VDDs from nearby
planes are fed to a multiplexer MUX. At each period of time, only one of these VDDs will be
selected to drive the crypto unit. A dynamic rotator is used to control the multiplexer. The
role of multiplexer is to assign varied supply voltages to the crypto unit at different time
slots in a complete process of running the cryptographic algorithm. Figure 6.4 demonstrates
the AES power consumption at three time periods. The values of sampling power are distin-
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Figure 6.2: Impact of the combination of multiple additive noises on correlation coefficient.
Figure 6.3: Proposed countermeasure multiplexing multiple voltage sources for the entire
crypto unit.
guished from each other. This indicates the power traces captured through CPA attacks are
altered by the voltage noise. Modification on the power consumption will impact the CPA
efficiency.
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Figure 6.4: AES power profiles measured at three different operation periods.
6.4 Experimental Results
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluated the proposed method by using FPGA emulation. We used a SAKURA-G
FPGA board. That board contains two Spartan-6 FPGAs: one (LX75 FPGA) for a crypto-
graphic implementation and the other (LX9 FPGA) for power traces capturing. The bitsream
asociated with the Verilog-HDL code for AES-128 was downloaded to the SAKURA-G board.
A Python-based ChipWhisperer [13] software was used to perform power trace capturing and
analysis. The other setup for the CPA attacks can be found in our prior work [14].
6.4.2 Improved Resilience against CPA Attacks
For AES-128, there are 16 key bytes in total. The main FPGA Spartan-6 XC6SLX75 is
powered by a supply voltage from the V CCINT pin. As the FPGA does not support
multiple supply voltages, we adjusted the value of VCCINT through a trimmer V R1 to
generate different supply voltages for the proposed TVSV implementation. The supply
voltage for AES was monitored by a multimeter through the on-board pin J1. We first
collected a set of AES power traces for each supply voltage at separate intervals and then
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Figure 6.5: Reduction on the number of retrieved key bytes achieved by the proposed method.
combined the multiple sets of the collected power traces in the ChipWhisperer Capture and
Analyzer tool during the process of CPA attack. In our emulation, we selected four voltage
levels: 1.1V, 1.15V, 1.2V and 1.25V (the standard value of VCCINT is 1.2V).
Key retrieval speed: The ChipWhisperer Analyzer retrieves the correct key for the
AES-128 by validating the crypto key byte by byte. Given a fixed number of power traces, the
less number of retrieved key bytes means a better resilience achieved by the countermeasure
against CPA attacks. At each voltage level, we generated eight ChipWhisperer projects,
each including 250 power traces. Then, we combined all power traces for different supply
voltages and different ChipWhisperer projects to form a complete power profile set for the
CPA attack on AES-128. As shown in Fig. 6.5, the proposed countermeasure effectively
thwarts the CPA attack. For the given 8000 power traces, the CPA attack is not able to
retrieve all 16 key bytes for the AES-128 protected with proposed method. In contrast, the
baseline leaks the crypto key with a rapider speed than our method. On average, our method
leaks 4.25 less key bytes than the baseline. Note, the AES-128 only has 16 key bytes and
hence 4.25 is a large portion of the total cryto key vector. The CPA attack on the baseline
was based on the 8000 power traces collected from the AES-128 operating at the supply
voltage of 1.2V.
The power traces for the experiment in Fig. 6.5 are evenly contributed by four different
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.6: Comparison of CPA key retrieval speed. (a) Power trace configuration and (b)
Number of retrieved key bytes for different number of power traces.
supply voltages. We further examined whether other combinations of the power traces
collected from different supply voltage scenarios will lead to a different key retrieval speed.
In addition to the baseline (all traces with 1.2V), we assembled the power traces with the
percentage shown in Fig. 6.6(a). For instance, in the configuration 1 (i.e. Config. 1 for
TVSV), the dominate power traces are contributed by the case running the supply voltage
of 1.25V. As shown in Fig. 6.6(b), no matter which configuration is used, our countermeasure
reveals less number of key bytes than the baseline. In addition, none of our configuration
allows the CPA attacks to retrieve all 16 key bytes within 8000 power traces. This further
confirms the proposed countermeasure indeed impacts the key retrieval efficiency of CPA
attacks.
Partial guessing entropy: To find out the reason behind the observation in Fig. 6.6(b),
we studied the partial guessing entropy (PGE) for each key byte. A smaller PGE means
less number of guessing is needed to identify the correct key byte. The accumulated PGE
(APGE) represents the total number of guesses that may take to retrieve the entire crypto
key. We examined the impact of different supply voltages on APGE. Figures 6.7(a) and (b)
show the APGEs for 16 AES key bytes based on the analysis of 4000 and 5000 power traces,
respectively. After comparing these two cases, we conclude that the general trend of APGE
for each supply voltage decreases when more power traces are analyzed. However, there is
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Figure 6.7: APGE obtained in CPA attacks based on (a) 4000 and (b) 5000 power traces.
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Figure 6.8: TVLA comparison between basic and our secured AES.
no obvious clue that indicates which voltage offers a better resilience against CPA attacks.
That explains why it is not clear which configurations used in the experiment for Fig. 6.6(b)
is the best in terms of resilience against CPA attacks.
Test vector leakage assessment: Leakage detection is important to validate the phys-
ical security of cryptographic devices. Test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) [63] approach
is one of the popular technique to detect the leakage. In this method, a set of preselected
test vectors is selected and then a statistical tests are performed on collected power mea-
surement. The test results into a confidence score using which a fail/pass decision can be
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made for the crypto under test.
We conducted the TVLA on the basic and proposed TVSV secured AES. Our goal is
to evaluate to what extent the data-dependency of the AES power traces can be mitigated
by our method. Each power trace collected by ChipWhisperer Capture consists of 396 time
instants, representing 396 sampling points. Based on all the 8000 power traces, collected
for the results shown in Fig. 6.5, we calculated the TVLA value for each time instant and
plotted in Fig. 6.8. R1 to R10 represents the AES first to 10th round. As shown in Fig. 6.8,
the TVLA absolute values for TVSV secured AES are generally lower than those for the
baseline AES for 10 AES rounds (roughly from 80 to 320). A smaller TVLA absolute value
means higher confidence to accept the null hypothesis [64]. We evaluate this confidence level





In which, pdf(t, v) is the probability density function of the Student’s t distribution with
the degrees of freedom of v. t is the t-test statistic and we simply use 16000 (8000 traces +
8000 traces) for v.
Because the previous results shown in Fig. 6.5 are obtained from the AES last round
attack performed in ChipWhisperer Analyzer, we zoom in the TVLA values for the time
instants observed in the AES last round. Those TVLA absolute values (roughly from 310
to 320) were averaged and saved in TV LAlr. The corresponding Prcon was also adopted to
quantify the mitigation ability against CPA attack. The values of TV LAlr and Prcon are
listed in table 6.1. The TV LAlr for basic AES is 4.9477, which is greater than 4.5. Note, 4.5
is defined as a threshold to determine whether the traces carry sensitive information [65].
The TV LAlr of our proposed method is below the threshold of 4.5. This result indicates
that our approach is less data dependent and leaks less sensitive information (i.e. key) than
the baseline. Our method also improves Prcon over 201× over the baseline.
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Baseline 4.9477 7.58×10−7 (100%)
Proposed method 3.7894 1.52×10−4 (201%)
6.4.3 Overhead on Power
The entire AES was implemented in the SAKURA-G FPGA board and the ChipWhisperer
tool captured 8000 power traces for each supply voltage (i.e. 1.1V, 1.15V, 1.2V, and 1.25V),
respectively. The average power consumption for each power trace was calculated in MAT-
LAB. The baseline power is the one using 1.2V. Four configurations shown in Fig. 6.6(a) were
adopted. We analyzed the power traces and balanced the power trace at the module level
and round level. Module level power balancing is achievable by using differential CMOS logic
(such as the method in [66]), which make each module consume the same power regardless
of which input pattern is applied. We used the AES round consuming the highest power to
replace the power profile for the remaining AES rounds, and calculated the average power
for the module level power balancing. Round level power balancing can be realized by the
current equalizer (such as the method in [67]). We assume the current equalizer technique
compensates the fluctuation on the AES current throughout the entire AES round operation
such that the AES power remains as high as the highest dynamic power observed in different
AES rounds. We compared the proposed method with the baseline, module level and round
level power balancing approaches and show the power reduction achieved by our method in
Fig. 6.9. As our method does not introduce additional noise to flatten the power, our method
can significantly reduce the power over the power balancing techniques. Depending on the
TVSV configuration pattern, the power reduction achieved by our method is in the range of
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Proposed over module level power equalization
Proposed over round level power equalization
Figure 6.9: Power reduction comparison.
14.4% to 19.7% at the module level, and in the range of 79.9% and 81.1% at the round level.
Since the TSV noise could lead the supply voltage exceed the nominal voltage, our method
consume more power by 1.3% than the baseline in the scenario of configuration 1 (that is
why power reduction is negative). For other three configurations, our method reduces the
power by 1.8%∼4.9%.
As different detailed settings used in different approaches [66–68], we could not repeat the
exact same experiment in our FPGA platform. We cited their reported power overhead and
compared those numbers with ours in Table 6.2. As shown, the algorithmic approach [68]
leads to 4.0× overhead on power, SABL consumes 1.9× power on AES, and the switched
capacitor current equalizer brings in 33% more power consumption. Instead of relying on
artificially induced noise, our method exploits the inherently existing noise to reduce the
power correlation. Thus, we can effectively reduce the power consumption of the crypto
module. Our case study shows that the proposed method leads to a power overhead no more
than 1.25% over the baseline.
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Power overhead +4.0× +1.9× +33% -81.1%∼+1.25%
6.5 Conclusion
We extended our group’s previous work of utilizing 3D PDN noise to mitigate CPA attack.
We proposed a TVSV method in this chapter to induce the noise to the victim crypto module
by combining the supply voltages from different 3D tiers temporally to drive the cypto
module. Emulation on an FPGA platform prove that the proposed implementation method
consumes significantly less power than the existing power balancing techniques. Our method
reduces the power overhead by up to 81.1% over the round-level power balancing technique.
The TVLA indicates proposed method reduces the risk of leaking sensitive information
through power traces and that shows the improvement on CPA resilience.
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CHAPTER 7
Towards Enhancing the IP Security of ICs and 3D ICs: Addressing the
Resilience Against Power Analysis Attacks on Logic Locking
7.1 Introduction
To reduce the time-to-market and manufacturing cost, IPs are commonly used in IC design-
ing. However, the fact that the modern IC manufacturing is often outsourced brings security
threats (e.g. IP piracy) to the supply chain [69]. The untrusted IC designers or foundries
in the supply chain have access to the IPs and they can overuse them for their own profit.
Moreover, with the access to the GDSII file of the IPs, adversaries can even reverse engineer
it to retrieve the original design.
To mitigate the impact caused by IP piracy, split-manufacturing and logic locking based
countermeasures are presented in the existing literature [10, 69, 70]. Split-manufacturing
proposes to split the layout of a design into the Front End Of Line (FEOL) and Back
End Of Line (BEOL), each of which is sent to different foundries to fabricate [10]. Thus,
each individual foundry only has partial knowledge of the design and they cannot make a
counterfeit product even if they hold the IPs. However, split-manufacturing will not help
on protecting M3D IPs because all the components of a M3D IC are fabricated by the same
foundry. To protect the IP security of M3D ICs, logic locking could be a better defense
mechanism which proposes to encrypt the netlist of the original IC and the encrypted chip
will only be activated with the locking key after the fabrication. In this way, malicious
foundries can not fully extract the logic function of the chip even with the access of its
GDSII design details. In another word, even attackers might successfully reverse engineer
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the chip to make counterfeits, the counterfeits cannot obtain the original function of the chip
and that can effectively thwart IP piracy attacks. Logic locking techniques usually insert
key-controlled logic gates or transistors to the netlist [3, 71] and will maintain or alter the
logic of the locked chip depending on the key inputs. They can protect M3D IPs but it is
critical to protect the key information from eavesdropping attacks, such as power analysis
attacks.
Logic locking based encryption algorithm is considered as having natural defense against
power analysis attacks [71]. This is because the locking keys are inserted in different places
through out the entire chip under protection and contribute to the dynamic power consump-
tion at different instants, which makes the sampling and alignment of the power traces diffi-
cult. However, there is limited work evaluating this resilience quantitatively. The work [71]
proposed the first algorithm of performing differential power analysis (DPA) attacks to logic
locking. According to the results reported, the DPA attack is able to retrieve part of the
locking keys. With the increase of the number of keys, however, the computing complexity
of the attack becomes higher while the key retrieving can be harder. This shows that logic
locking is indeed resilient to the DPA attack. In this chapter, we evaluate the resilience
of logic locking against a more powerful and more efficient power analysis attack, correla-
tion power analysis (CPA) attack. Furthermore, we propose a logic-cone conjunction (LLC)




Different from the stacked 3D IC, a M3D IC only has one silicon substrate and the compo-
nents of all the M3D layers, including transistors, poly-silicon and metal, are fabricated on
the substrate sequentially. The inter-lay connection uses monolithic inter-tier vias (MIVs)
instead of TSVs. Compared to TSVs, MIVs’ fabrication involves similar materials and pro-
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cesses. However, MIVs are usually smaller in size which facilitate M3D ICs having even
better performance than TSV-based stacked 3D ICs. On the other hand, M3D layers are
fabricated on one single wafer in one foundry. In this case, the split manufacturing strategy
cannot be applied to protect M3D ICs from IP piracy attacks. To solve this security problem,
logic locking-based methods have been investigated by researchers.
Logic locking is an encryption technology for securing the original logic function of digital
circuits from IP piracy attacks.
7.2.2 Conventional Gate-Level Logic Locking
Conventionally, logic locking [17] inserts key-controlled gates to the original design that needs
to be protected, as know as the gate-level logic locking. The specific implementation of gate-
level logic locking varies with the locking goal, such as obtaining higher output corruptibility
or better resilience against key-retrieval attacks. For example, the fault analysis-based logic
locking (FLL) inserts the key-controlled gates to the locations, which have the highest fault
impacts on achieving the maximum output corruptibility [72]. A strong inference-based logic
locking (SLL) is proposed in [73] to thwart the key sensitization attack. The work [74] uses
multiplexers, instead of XOR/XNOR gates, to expand the logic cone size and thus improve
the defense capability against cone-based brute-force attacks.
7.2.3 Transistor-Level Camouflaged Logic Locking
In contrast, the transistor-level logic locking internally modifies the existing logic gates of
the original circuit by injecting key-controlled transistors. Comparing to the gate-level logic
locking, the transistor-level logic locking usually incurs much less overhead that is caused
by the extra logic gates. For example, the transistor-level camouflaged logic locking method
introduced in [3] protects the IP security of M3D ICs by inserting parallel or serial locking
transistors and camouflaged contacts in M3D tiers. Fig. 7.1 shows two styles of this locking
scheme: serial locking shown in Fig. 7.1(a) and parallel locking shown in Fig. 7.1(b). More
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.1: The transistor-level camouflaged logic locking in (a) serial locking and (b) parallel
locking styles [3].
specifically, the locking scheme has four specific configurations including PMOS serial lock-
ing (PSL), NMOS serial locking (NSL), PMOS parallel locking (PPL), and NMOS parallel
locking (NPL). The locked network only functions normally when the correct locking key is
provided otherwise, will generate a floating or constant output.
Because our research focuses on evaluating and improving the attack resilience of the logic
locking techniques in M3D ICs, this transistor-level camouflaged logic locking method will be
investigated further in the chapter. We simplify the two styles to create a follow-up version
of the transistor-level logic locking and an example of a NAND gate locked in the simplified
version is shown in Fig. 7.2. The simplified version also has two styles: PMOS serial locking
plus NMOS parallel locking (PSLNPL) and PMOS parallel locking plus NMOS serial locking
(PPLNSL). The wrong key in the PSLNPL style will lead the NAND gate output to be a
constant 0. Likewise in the configuration of PPLNSL, the wrong key will yield a constant 1
at the output of NAND.
7.2.4 DPA and CPA Attacks
CPA attack has been introduced in Chapter 6. Besides CPA, differential power analysis
(DPA) attack is anther strong power analysis attack. It was first proposed in Paul Kocher’s
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Figure 7.2: A NAND gate locked with the transistor-level logic locking in (a) PSLNPL and
(b) PPLNSL configurations.
paper [75] in 1999 and has drawn great attention over the last two decades. Similar with
CPA, DPA also exploits the fact that the power consumption of a chip is correlated to
its internal data being processed to retrieve the secret key applied in the crypto hardware
module. Attackers need to collect the power traces from their target chips that run the
encryption algorithm with an unknown secret key and a set of known input patterns. The
same input patterns will be used to calculate the outputs of encryption with a guessing key.
Based on the collected power traces and the calculated outputs for different guessing keys,
a statistical metric differential trace can be generated to guide attackers to determine which
guessing key is the correct one applied in the hardware crypto module.
Theoretical Difference Between DPA and CPA
Assume that the target encryption process is E(p, k), in which E stands for the encryption
algorithm and it is usually also defined as a selection function. The variables p and k represent
the plaintext and the encryption key, respectively. For a given plaintext, the corresponding
ciphertext c equals to E(p, k). Attackers will randomly guess a key, kguess, and then calculate
a set of ciphertexts, C, with regards to a group of plaintexts P . The same process is repeated
for different kguess while the set of P remains the same. The same plaintexts P will also be
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applied to the real chip to produce the corresponding power traces T . Thus, each guessing
key kguess will have a pair of the ciphertext set C and the power trace set T .
In DPA attacks, depending on each element c in the set C equal to 0 or 1, each single
power trace t in T is first classified to one of the two sets T0 and T1. Next, the DoM defined
in Eq. 7.1 is calculated for each guessing key kguess. The differential trace is also known as
difference of means (DoM).
DoM = |T0− T1| (7.1)
In which, T0 and T1 are the averages of T0 and T1, respectively. The kguess that yields the
highest DoM is considered as the correct key by the DPA attack.
In CPA attacks, a hypothetical power consumption Thyp is estimated based on the set
C for each kguess and the power estimation model, Hamming distance or Hamming weight
model [13]. Equation 7.2 describes how the PCC between Thyp and T is calculated.
PCC =
E[Thyp · T ]− E[Thyp] · E[T ]√
E[T 2hyp]− (E[Thyp])2 ·
√
E[T 2]− (E[T ])2
(7.2)
Each guessing key kguess will have a corresponding PCC. The kguess that has the highest
PCC will be considered as the correct key by the CPA attack.
According to the experimental results from [76], the incorrect key guesses may gener-
ate spikes on the differential trace for DPA, known as ”harmonics” [12], which will lead
to the unsuccess of key retrieval. However, the impact of harmonics on CPA is minimum.
Furthermore, the comparative analysis in [77] indicates that the noise from semiconductor
integration process also has less impact to CPA than DPA. Other literature [13] also shows
that CPA outperforms DPA in both efficiency and robustness because CPA can better tol-
erate noise than DPA. As a result, CPA is a better choice when the target of attack is in a
complicated noise environment, such as 3D ICs.
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Figure 7.3: Hardware setup of power analysis attacks
Practical Implementation Comparison
The advantages of CPA attack over DPA attack are originated from its statistical metric but
not practical implementation. In fact, DPA and CPA attacks have the identical experimental
setups, as shown in Fig. 7.3. They both drive the target chip that implements crypto modules
with a set of plaintexts. The plaintexts could be generated in and exported from a personal
computer (PC). The power measurement is obtained through a resistor (R) that is connected
in series with the chip. The resister could be inserted in between the chip and power supply
(VDD), or in between the chip and ground [78]. The oscilloscope measures the voltage (V )
across the resistor and the transient current (I) can be calculated as V/R. The power
consumption (P ) of the chip can be obtained as P = (V/R) · VDD (note that R is usually
very small so that its power consumption can be ignored). The only difference between the
two attacks is the statistical metrics used are different. The metric of PCC outperforms the
metric of differential trace in tolerating noise and reducing computing complexity so that
CPA attack is usually considered to be more powerful than DPA attack.
DPA and CPA Attacks in Logic Locking
There is limited work discussing the DPA and CPA attack resilience of logic locking tech-
niques. In the existing literature, only DPA attacks are performed on gate-level logic lock-
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Figure 7.4: The proposed flow for the CPA attack on a general circuit protected by logic
locking.
ing [71] but CPA attacks have not been examined in the context of logic locking techniques.
To fill this gap, this chapter will propose a CPA attack to logic locking and further compre-
hensively evaluate the DPA and CPA resilience of the transistor-level logic locking comparing
to the conventional gate-level logic locking.
7.3 Proposed Attack Flow for CPA Attacks on Locked Circuits
CPA is more powerful than DPA in key retrieval and it is necessary to evaluate the re-
silience of transistor-level logic locking against CPA attacks. In this chapter, inspired by
the divide-and-conquer strategy of [71], we modify the conventional CPA attack flow for
cryptosystems and propose a feasible general power estimation procedure. Our CPA attack
on the transistor-level logic locking includes four steps.
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Algorithm 2: Proposed logic cone extraction.
Data: Locked netlist
Result: Logic function of each logic cone
1 PrimaryOut[]← Find primary outputs;
2 PrimaryIn[]← Find primary inputs;
3 Key[]← Find key inputs;
4 i = 1;
5 while i ≤ length(PrimaryOut[]) do
6 Target← PrimaryOut[i];
7 while Target /∈ PrimaryIn[] && Target /∈ Key[] do
8 SelFunc← Target;
9 Search logic gate G(Input, Target);




14 i = i+ 1;
15 end
Step 1: logic cone extraction. The flow of estimated power generation is depicted
in Fig. 7.4. First, the logic cones of the locked netlist are extracted based on the primary
outputs. To facilitate the logic cone extraction, we develop a Python script and Algorithm 2
shows the its pseudo-code. The script returns the logic function of each logic cone, which
will be used as the selection function (SelFunc) in the CPA attack. Given a locked netlist,
Algorithm 2 searches for the logic gate (G) that generates each primary output of the netlist.
The inputs of G will be the target of the next search until all the new targets are either the
primary inputs or the key inputs of the netlist. The located G during this process will form
the final SelFunc for the primary out. This process is repeated for each primary output
until all logic cones are completed.
Step 2: divide-and-conquer-based power estimation. The CPA attack starts from
the smallest logic cone, which includes the least number of locking key bits. This ascending
order is adopted for two main reasons. First, the ratio of the number of keys to the number
of primary inputs (#Keys/#Primary Inputs) of a smaller cone is smaller, too. As a result,
retrieving the keys in a smaller cone is easier than in a larger one [71]. Second, some keys
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may appear in multiple cones and the keys that have been previously retrieved in the smaller
cones can be used in the attack of the current cone. In this case, the attack will be more
likely to succeed since the number of unresolved keys is reduced. Next, a set of input patterns
with a random key guess are fed to the extracted selection function (SelFunc in Step 1) of
the cone and the estimated outputs for the key guess are calculated. We utilize a Hamming
distance model to generate the estimated power. The same process will be repeated for all
key guesses and all logic cones.
Step 3: power trace collection. Similarly, the real power trace collection starts from
the smallest logic cone and follows the ascending order. For each cone, the same set of
the input patterns used in the power estimation are applied to the chip under attack and
the physical power consumption is collected. Since only the inputs of the cone currently
under attack will be fed with the input patterns, the switching activities of other cones
will be minimized and thus there is limited interference from other cones. In parallel with
the power consumption measuring, the output patterns of the same cone under attack are
recorded from the chip to verify the retrieved key values.
Step 4: correlation analysis. We calculate the PCC between the estimated power
and the real power consumption to retrieve the keys of each logic cone. The key guess which
yields the highest PCC is considered as the correct key retrieved by the CPA attack.
7.4 Resilience Assessment of Logic Locking Against Power Analysis Attacks
With the proposed CPA attack, we are able to perform a comprehensive evaluation of the
attack resilience of logic locking against power analysis attacks, including both DPA and
CPA attacks. In this section, we discuss our evaluation from two perspectives which are the
comparison between the DPA and CPA resilience and the comparison between the gate-level
and the transistor-level logic locking techniques.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.5: c17 protected with (a) XOR-based gate-level and (b) transistor-level logic locking.
7.4.1 Perspective 1: Comparison of the DPA and CPA Resilience of Logic Locking
Resilience against DPA Attack
We performed the DPA attack on an ISCAS’85 benchmark circuit, c17. As the circuit c17
has two output ports N22 and N23, there are two logic cones highlighted by the two dash-line
boxes shown in Fig 7.5. The c17 locked by XOR-based gate locking is shown in Fig. 7.5(a).
We also applied PSLNPL and PPLNSL to the NAND and OR-AND-INVERT (OAI) logic
gates in c17, as shown in Fig. 7.5(b). The detailed experimental setup is described in
Section 7.4.2.
The DoM measured by the DPA attack on c17 protected with three logic locking methods
are reported in Figs. 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8. For the N22 cone, Fig. 7.6(a) shows that the DoM line
for the correct key is above that for the wrong key, which indicates that the locking key bit
applied in the N22 cone can be retrieved by the DPA attack. For the N23 cone, as shown in
Fig. 7.6(b), the DoM lines for the correct and wrong keys are overlapped, which means that
the DPA attack does not find the correct key. Overall, Fig. 7.6 confirms that gate-level logic
locking has 50% resilience against the DPA attack. Based on the measured DoM metrics for
PSLNPL and PPLNSL transistor-level locking shown in Figs. 7.7 and 7.8, we conclude that
the DPA attack fails to retrieve the locking key bits in 75% of the test cases.
According to the introduction in Section 7.2.3, the wrong locking key at the transistor-
level locking will lead to a constant output. This characteristic could form a natural defense
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Figure 7.6: DoM for (a) N22 cone and (b) N23 cone in c17 locked with XOR-based gate-level
locking.




























Figure 7.7: DoM for (a) N22 cone and (b) N23 cone in c17 locked with PSLNPL.
line to thwart the DPA attack. When the constant output induced by the wrong key is
fed to another logic gate as a controlling bit (e.g., constant 1 to OR gate), the output of
the subsequent gate will be constant, too. If more key bits are inserted in the circuit, the
probability of propagating the constant output to the primary output is likely to increase.
Since the wrong key guess leads the primary output to be a constant 1 (0), all the power
traces will be grouped into the power set T1 (T0). Consequently, the wrong key guess will
yield a higher DoM than the correct key, and thus the DPA attack will conclude a wrong
key. In summary, once the wrong key causes the primary output of the locked netlist to be
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Figure 7.8: DoM for (a) N22 cone and (b) N23 cone in c17 locked with PPLNSL.
Figure 7.9: The impact of transistor-level locking on the output.
constant, the DoM metric will mislead the DPA key retrieval.
We studied the three DPA failed cases shown in Figs. 7.7(a) and (b) and Fig. 7.8(b) and
observed that the primary outputs in those cases are indeed constant regardless of what
primary inputs were provided. For example, if the guessed Key0 is wrong in the PSLNPL
configuration, the output of the locked NAND in Fig. 7.5(b) will be constant 0, which further
causes N22 to be constant 1, as shown in Fig. 7.9. In this case, the locking key obtained by
the DPA attack is wrong because all the power traces are grouped to T1. Due to the same
reason (but different constant outputs of the locked gates), the other two cases represented
by Figs. 7.7(b) and 7.8(b) also fail to retrieve the correct locking keys.
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Resilience against CPA Attack
The CPA attack was executed on the same c17 circuit for both the XOR-based gate-level
locking and the transistor-level locking. The metric PCC was utilized to differentiate the
correct key from the wrong ones. As shown in Fig. 7.10, for the N22 cone, the PCC of the
correct key case is much higher than the PCC of the wrong key; while for the N23 cone, the
correct and incorrect key guesses lead to comparable PCCs after the initial vibration stage.
This observation means, in the case of XOR-based locking, the CPA attack can successfully
retrieve the key bit in the N22 cone but cannot retrieve the key bit in the N23 cone. In
the case of the c17 locked with the transistor-level locking, the PCC for the correct key
guess is higher than that for the wrong key guess after 40 power traces. This observation
holds true for both N22 and N23 logic cones, as shown in Figs. 7.11 and 7.12. This means
that the locking key bits in both cones can be successfully identified by the CPA attack.
In the case of the N23 cone locked with the PPLNSL configuration, the estimated power
consumption has no correlation with the real power traces. This is because the wrong Key1
shown in Fig. 7.5(b) leads to a constant 0 on the output of the N23 logic cone. Based on the
Hamming distance/Hamming weight model, the estimated power consumption is constant 0,
too. According to Eq. (7.2), no valid PCC can be calculated. In summary, the CPA attack
can retrieve all the locking key bits in the transistor-level locking cases but the DPA attack
only partially recovers the key.
The experimental results above indicate that the PCC metric used in CPA attacks is
not affected by the constant output caused by the wrong key guess at the transistor-level
locking. Instead, the constant output facilities the CPA attack to succeed. This is because
the estimated power consumption Thyp will be constant once the estimated output C is
constant due to the wrong key guess. Based on the definition of PCC, a constant sequence
will have no correlation with the real power consumption T . As a result, the wrong key
guess can be easily excluded by the CPA attack.
On the other hand, the CPA attack can be mitigated by the gate-level logic locking,
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Figure 7.10: PCC for (a) N22 cone and (b) N23 cone in c17 locked with XOR-based gate-level
locking.




























Figure 7.11: PCC for (a) N22 cone and (b) N23 cone in c17 locked with PSLNPL.
as shown in Fig. 7.10(b). The XOR-based gate-level locking will lead the locked gate to
produce a flipped output if a wrong key is applied. Once the wrong output is propagated to
the primary output of the logic cone, the PCCs for the wrong and correct key cases will be
the same, no matter which power model is employed in power estimation. If the Hamming
distance model is used, Thyp for the wrong key guess will be identical with the one for the
correct key and so is PCC. For example, the original output sequence is [10010] and the
flipped sequence is [01101]. Then, the Thyp based on the Hamming distance model is [1011]
for both sequences. If the Hamming weight model is adopted, Thyp for the wrong key guess
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Figure 7.12: PCC for (a) N22 cone and (b) N23 cone in c17 locked with PPLNSL.
will toggle oppositely to the one for the correct key guess. Although this flipped Thyp for
the wrong key results in a reversed PCC, the |PCC| is still the same with the one for the
correct key guess. Consequently, the CPA attack cannot differentiate the wrong key from
the correct key for either case. We zoomed in the failed CPA case in the c17 locked with
the XOR-based locking and found that its primary output was indeed flipped when a wrong
key was given. However, it is not always possible to propagate the constant output in bigger
circuits. The CPA resilience provided by the gate-level locking only happens in rare cases.
In summary, our case study indicates that the proposed CPA attack outperforms the
DPA attack in the scenario of transistor-level logic locking. We will zoom in on the CPA
resilience of transistor-level logic locking and further compare it with the gate-level logic
locking from different perspectives using more benchmarks in the following section.
7.4.2 Perspective 2: Comparison of CPA Resilience between the Transistor-Level and Gate-
level Logic Locking Techniques
We performed various experiments to evaluate the CPA resilience of the PSLNPL and
PPLNSL based transistor-level locking and the XOR-based gate-level techniques using the
following setup. The three logic locking methods were applied to the ISCAS’85 benchmark
circuits, including c432, c880, c2670 and c3540. The HOPE simulator [79] was adopted to
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execute the FLL strategy [72] for key bit insertion. The CPA attack was performed by FPGA
emulations and transistor-level simulations in Cadence Virtuoso. In the FPGA emulation,
the locked circuits were mapped to the SAKURA-G FPGA board and the power traces were
collected through ChipWhisperer. In the transistor-level simulation, the locked circuits were
implemented with the NCSU FreePDK45 technology.
The key recovery rate (KRR) [71] defined in Eq. (7.3) is used to assess the efficiency of
CPA attacks on the benchmark circuits protected with XOR-based gate-level logic locking
and the transistor-level PSLNPL and PPLNSL logic locking. In this subsection, we examine






Impact of Locking Level on Attack Resilience
The key insertion locations for the XOR-based gate-level locking were determined by the FLL
strategy recommended by the HOPE simulator. The key bits for the transistor-level locking
were inserted to the same locations recognized by FLL. Due to the different numbers of logic
gates in c432 and c2670, 8 and 16 key bits were used in the encryption, respectively. As
shown in Table 7.1, the PPLNSL transistor-level locking achieves better CPA resilience than
the XOR-based gate-level locking in the case of c432; however, as the circuit scale increases,
the XOR-based locking on c2670 outperforms both PSLNPL and PPLNSL, reducing the
KRR by 66%. We further analyzed the guessing entropy to compare the key retrieval speed.
As shown in Fig. 7.13, the guessing entropy of the CPA attack on c2670 protected with XOR-
based locking is always higher than that for the same circuit encrypted by the transistor-level
locking. Both KRR and guessing entropy indicates that PSLNPL and PPLNSL transistor-
level locking is more vulnerable to the CPA attack than XOR-based gate-level locking.
Due to the different circuit scale, 7 and 11 key bits were applied to c432 and c880,
99
Table 7.1: KRR results for CPA attacks on two locked benchmark circuits.
circuit \ locking configuration XOR PSLNPL PPLNSL
c432 100% 100% 50%
c2670 18.75% 56.25% 56.25%
Figure 7.13: Guessing entropy comparison for the case of c2670.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.14: KRR results for (a) c432 (b) c880.
respectively. The KRR of the CPA attack on c432 and c880 is shown in Fig. 7.14. With
4000 power traces, our CPA attack retrieved all the key bits for c432 no matter which locking
configuration was used; for the bigger circuit c880, the CPA attack also achieved a 100%
KRR in the PPLNSL configuration.
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Figure 7.15: Impact of the number of key bits per cone on KRR.
Impact of Number of Key Bits on Attack Resilience
We swept the number of key bits inserted in c432 from 1 key bit per cone to 3 key bits per
cone for both the gate-level and transistor-level logic locking techniques. As indicated in
Fig. 7.15, given 800 power traces, all three locking methods achieve the KRR of 0% as the
number of key bits increases. Our case study indicates that increasing the key space will
improve the resilience against the CPA attack. This motivates us to develop a mitigation
method to enlarge the key space and the logic cone size interested in the CPA attack.
Impact of Different Key Locations on Attack Resilience
We randomly selected the key locations for the c432 locked with both the XOR-based locking
and the transistor-level locking. The KRR results shown in Fig. 7.16 imply that the KRR
has strong dependency on the locking location, no matter at gate level or transistor level.
This motivates us to propose a key insertion location guideline to find the best key locations
for the transistor-level logic locking to achieve the highest CPA resilience.
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Figure 7.16: The impact of random key insertion locations on KRR.
7.5 Proposed Logic-Cone Conjunction (LCC) Method against CPA Attacks
The CPA attack in Section 7.3 follows the divide-and-conquer strategy to break the locked
circuit cone by cone. To thwart the cone-based brute force attack, the work [74] uses MUX-
based key gates to connect logic cones so that the key space and the cone size for one single
cone is expanded. Inspired by that work, we propose a logic-cone conjunction (LCC) method
to mitigate the CPA attack on transistor-level logic locking circuits. The MUX-based attack
mitigation method uses multiplexers to create a small overlap area between two logic cones.
However, there will always be some keys out of the overlap area. Those keys will not help in
expanding the key space unless the two nets connected by the multiplexers are both primary
outputs. In contrast, our LCC method embeds one entire logic cone into another one such
that the key space can be enlarged significantly. Typically, increasing the number of key bits
is a common practice to raise the difficulty of CPA attacks. The proposed LCC method does
not induce additional key bit insertion; instead, our method makes full use of the existing
locking keys in a locked circuit to maximize the key space of each logic cone. The key space
means the number of all possible distinct key combinations.
The proposed LCC inserts a key-controlled dummy connection dmcij between two inde-
pendent logic cones Ci and Cj to extend the size of each logic cone. To maximize the key
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space after our logic-cone conjunction, the selected independent logic cones Ci and Cj should




Kj, respectively. The LCC method will increase the
key space for the logic cone Ci from 2
Ki to 2Ki+Kj . In the best case, Ki + Kj will be equal
to the number of all key bits inserted in the locked circuit.
Figures 7.17 (a) and (b) illustrate how the proposed LCC method is applied to the
PSLNPL and PPLNSL transistor-level locking circuits. Cone1 and Cone2 are dependent due
to the original connection ogc12. In contrast, Cone1 and Cone3 are originally independent
since there is no logic overlap between them.
For the configuration of PSLNPL shown in Fig. 7.17(a), designers can insert one key bit,
Key1, to the NAND gate in Cone2. The correct key value for Key1 should be logic 0 since
Cone1 and Cone2 are originally connected and Cone2 needs signal ogc12 to switch normally.
Note that inserting Key1 is an important step in LCC. In Cone 3, a dummy NAND locked
by the PSLNPL configuration with the key bit Key2 is added. This NAND gate is driven
by the output signal dmc13 from Cone1 and the net N2, which is any existing net in Cone3.
The correct key value for Key2 should be logic 1, which forces the output of the NAND to be
constant 0. As the constant 0 will be given to an input of an OR gate, the dummy connection
dmc13 will not interrupt the original Cone3 operation. Because 0 is the non-controlling bit
of an OR gate, its output will be determined by the original net N3. The output of the
Cone3 dmc31 is brought back to Cone1 to form a cyclic structure between Cone1 and Cone3
using a similar dummy connection. The dummy conjunction between Cone1 and Cone3
will increase the key space for both cones. In this case, the key space for Cone1 (Cone3)
is increased from 2K1 (2K3) to 2K1+K3 . Furthermore, no matter which cone is attacked, the
cyclic logic structure makes the other cones also switch, thus inducing noise to the power
traces collected for CPA attacks. The power noise blurs the correlation between the locking
key and the power traces.
The LCC for PPLNSL configuration can be implemented in a similar way. As shown in
Fig. 7.17(b), we replace the OR gate with an AND gate and the correct Key2 is logic 0. This
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.17: LCC diagram for (a) PSLNPL and (b) PPLNSL configurations.
is because applying a logic 0 to the NAND gate locked with PPLNSL will lead to a constant
1, which is the non-controlling bit for the AND gate. The logic gates used in Fig. 7.17 can
be substituted with other gates as long as the normal operations of the revised cones can
be maintained when the correct key is provided. To achieve the maximum key space, there
could be more than two cones in the conjunction.
The proposed LCC significantly improves the CPA resilience of the transistor-level logic
locking for two reasons. First, it significantly enlarges the key space for every single cone to
mitigate the cone-based CPA attack. Second, as the LCC method forms the connected cones
as a cyclic structure, no matter which cone in the structure is attacked, all other cones will
switch. The increased switching activities lead to some power noise, which interferes with
the power trace measurement for CPA attacks.
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7.6 Proposed Key Insertion Guideline for Transistor-Level Logic Locking to
Improve CPA Resilience
In this section, we propose a new strategy that facilitates to search for better key insertion
locations for defending CPA attacks.
The work [71] evaluates the DPA resilience of gate-level logic locking techniques. That
work also provides two suggestions to harden the locking circuit against DPA attacks: (1)
increase the ratio of key bits to the number of primary inputs of the logic cone, and (2)
insert key bits in a way that the locked circuit functions closely to the original circuit even
when a wrong key is given. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work
available discussing how to enhance the transistor-level logic locking with respect to the CPA
attack resilience. To fill this gap, we propose a new guideline (composed of three rules) for
the optimal key insertion locations in PSLNPL and PPLNSL based transistor-level locking
configuration.
• Rule 1: Avoid inserting a key bit to a gate, whose wrong constant output can be
propagated to the primary outputs of the locked circuits.
• Rule 2: Use the PSLNPL configuration to lock the gates that have logic 0 as their
majority output (e.g., AND and NOR gates).
• Rule 3: Use the PPLNSL configuration to lock the gates that have logic 1 as their
majority output (e.g., OR and NAND gates).
As we observed in Section 7.4.1, the wrong key induced constant primary output will
result in an invalid PCC in the CPA algorithm and thus those wrong key guesses can be easily
eliminated from the attack process. The proposed rule 1 defers the quick key elimination.
In some cases, the primary output may be reversely constant (e.g., logic 1 at the primary
output but logic 0 at the gate output), which should be avoided, too.
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Output corruptibility is a classic metric evaluating the ability of logic locking techniques
in altering the original logic function when wrong keys are given. Usually, a higher output
corruptibility will provide a better defense to IP piracy attacks or counterfeiting. However,
a lower output corruptibility is more favorable in the sense of thwarting the CPA attack.
We denote the difference between the PCC values for a wrong key and a correct key as
DIFFPCC . As the CPA attack retrieves the correct key by searching for the key yielding
the highest PCC, we suggest exploring countermeasures against the CPA attack that can
minimize DIFFPCC . A method that lowers the output corruptibility helps to achieve a
smaller DIFFPCC and obtain a better CPA attack resilience.
Inspired on the relation between the output corruptibility and the CPA resilience, the
proposed rules 2 and 3 will enable the transistor-level logic locking to reduce the output
corruptibility. We use an NAND gate as an example to explain the utilization of the proposed
rules 2 and 3. The majority of the NAND output is logic 1. When a wrong key is given,
PSLNPL (PPLNSL) will force the output of the locked gate to be a constant 0(1). In
this case, the wrong key of a PPLNSL locked NAND gate may not change the original
logic output of the locked circuit as much as that of the PSLNPL configuration. This
is because the NAND gate outputs logic 1 for most time (if its input 0/1 is uniformly
distributed). It is reasonable to infer that the PCC for the wrong key in PPLNSL is closer
to that for the correct key compared to the scenario of PSLNPL. As a result, we conclude
that DIFFPCC(PPLNSL) / DIFFPCC(PSLNPL). Thus, it is more difficult for CPA to
differentiate the correct key from the wrong keys in the PPLNSL configuration than in the
case of PSLNPL configuration.
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7.7 Experimental Results for The Proposed CPA Resilience Enhancement Meth-
ods
7.7.1 Experimental Setup
We performed the experimental verification and evaluation for the proposed LCC and the key
insertion guideline through FPGA emulations. Both PSLNPL and PPLNSL configurations,
with and without LCC, using and not using the proposed key insertion guideline were applied
to the ISCAS benchmark circuits and implemented in a SAKURA-G FPGA board. The
power traces were collected using ChipWhisperer software. The CPA algorithm was realized
in MATLAB and the Xilinx Vivado design suite. The hardware overhead of LCC was assessed
in the Xilinx PlanAhead and XPower Analyzer software.
7.7.2 Experimental Results for LCC
Seven key bits were inserted to c432 for both PSLNPL and PPLNSL configurations following
the fault analysis-based logic locking (FLL) [72] to achieve the maximum output corrupt-
ibility. c432 has seven logic cones for the primary outputs N223, N329, N370, N421, N430,
N431, and N432. N223 is also an input for the logic cone of N329. Furthermore, N329 is
fed to the logic cone of N370. Finally, N370 drives the logic cones for N421, N430, N431,
and N432. Based on the locked netlist, we found that connecting the output of N421 cone
to N223 cone can help to maximize the key space and induce the largest amount of noise to
the power traces. In the following experiments, we assume that there is an extra key beside
the seven keys to lock the dummy connection logic between N421 and N223 cones and this
extra key is known to the CPA attacker for a fair comparison with the baseline.
Improved Resilience against CPA Attack
We collected 4000 power traces for the assessment of KRR. As shown in Fig. 7.18, the CPA
attack successfully retrieves all the 7 keys (100% KRR) of the baseline c432 for both locking
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Figure 7.18: KRR comparison for (a) PSLNPL and (b) PPLNSL configurations.
Figure 7.19: Guessing entropy comparison.
configurations. In contrast, the KRR of the c432 protected with LCC decreases from 100%
to 0% for both PSLNPL and PPLNSL locking configurations. We also zoom in the guessing
entropy for the baseline and the LCC-protected c432. As shown in Fig. 7.19, the guessing
entropy of the baseline is close to 0 while the proposed LCC improves the entropy to a much
higher level. Both KRR and guessing entropy indicate that the LCC method successfully
enhances the locking circuit’s resilience against the CPA attack.
The improved attack resilience is originated from the cyclic structure generated by LCC.
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Cone Interference (CI).
cones
PSLNPL PPLNSL
Baseline LCC Baseline LCC
N432 81.44% 82.37% 81.86% 81.45%
N431 81.30% 81.75% 81.45% 82.11%
N430 82.13% 82.05% 82.19% 81.13%
N421 90.32% 90.02% 90.62% 90.59%
N370 83.42% 82.53% 82.81% 83.25%
N329 27.96% 86.72% 26.84% 86.60%
N223 0% 95% 0% 94.87%
Because of the cyclic logic loop, the uninterested cones will have logic switching when the
target cone is under attack. Consequently, LCC yields some power noise and thus undermines
the CPA attack. We use a metric Cone Interference(CI) expressed in Eq. (7.4) to evaluate
the noise induced by LCC.
CI =
Switching Events of Uninterested Cones
Switching Events of Entire Circuit
(7.4)
In which Switching Events of Uninterested Cones is the total number of bit flips on the
primary outputs of the logic cones that the attacker is not interested in. Switching Events
of Entire Circuit is the total number of bit flips on all the primary outputs of the circuit.
Based on the results shown in Table 7.2, LCC significantly improves the cone interference
in the attacks to N223 and N329 cones. This is because LCC forces all 7 cones of c432 to
switch no matter which one is under attack. Because cones N223 and N329 are the smallest
cones that are included in any other cone of c432, interfering with the power traces of these
two cones is extremely important to securing the entire circuit. The cone interference for
the LCC protected c432 and the baseline are comparably high after N329. Since all the
remaining cones are driven by all the primary inputs of c432, all 7 cones of c432 will switch
when any of the logic cones N370, N421, N430, N431, and N432 is under attack.
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Figure 7.20: Delay overhead.
Overhead on Delay and Power
As the proposed LCC makes full use of the existing locking keys to expand the key space
without inducing new key insertions, the hardware cost for our method is minor. The critical-
path delay was measured via the Xilinx PlanAhead software. As shown in Fig. 7.20, the
proposed LCC only increases the delay by 1.72% and 2.62% for the PSLNPL and PPLNSL
configurations, respectively.
The power overhead was measured via the Xilinx XPower Analyzer. Based on the results
shown in Fig. 7.21, for the PSLNPL based logic locking, LCC consumes 1% and 1.54% more
power when the correct keys and the wrong keys are applied, respectively. For the PPLNSL
configuration, LCC leads to 1.34% and 1.88% more power consumption for the scenarios
that the correct and wrong keys were applied, respectively.
7.7.3 Experimental Results for Key Insertion Guideline
Improved Resilience against CPA Attack
Next, we followed the proposed three rules for optimal key locations to lock c2670. Based
on the comparison in Table 7.3, our method reduces the KRR of the transistor-level locking
to be the same with the KRR that the XOR-based gate-level locking obtains. As shown
in Table 7.4, the selected logic gates for the PSLNPL key insertion have a relatively high
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Figure 7.21: Power overhead for (a) PSLNPL and (b) PPLNSL configurations.
Table 7.3: Impact of FLL and proposed key location selection strategy on KRR.








Table 7.4: Key locations following the proposed strategy.
Locking configuration Key insertion
PSLNPL 7 AND5, 8 AND4, 1 AND3
PPLNSL 2 OR5, 12 OR4, 2 OR3
probability to have logic 0 as outputs. Likewise, the selected key gates for the PPLNSL
configuration have a high probability to output logic 1. The FLL strategy for the XOR-
based locking is not an option for the transistor-level locking. The constant gate outputs
caused by wrong keys could be propagated to the primary outputs, which facilitate the CPA
attack.
Furthermore, the guessing entropy for the transistor-level locking configured following
the FLL and the proposed key location is compared in Fig. 7.22. NEWLOC PSLNPL and
NEWLOC PPLNSL represent the PSLNPL and PPLNSL locking configured with our pro-
posed locking locations. As can be seen, our method improves the guessing entropy by
25.36× and 26.04× for PSLNPL and PPLNSL, respectively, based on the 4000 power traces.
The output corruptibility of the XOR-based gate-level locking and transistor-level locking
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Figure 7.22: Guessing entropy comparison for (a) PSLNPL and (b) PPLNSL configurations.












XOR 1.90% 6.99% 10.24%
PSLNPL 0.98% 4.23% 8.00%
PPLNSL 0.93% 3.95% 7.89%
Proposed
strategy
PSLNPL 0.11% 0.32% 0.62%
PPLNSL 0.48% 1.58% 3.35%
is compared in Table 7.5. We measured the output corruptibility for the cases of 1 bit, 5
bits and all bits wrong. For the cases of 1 bit wrong, we swept the wrong key bit for all 16
locations and reported the averaged output corruptibility. For the cases of 5 bits wrong, we
randomly selected the wrong key bit locations four times and presented the averaged result
of the four corresponding output corruptibility. As shown in Table 7.5, if the FLL strategy is
applied, the transistor-level locking has the comparable output corruptibility with the XOR-
based locking in each test case. However, the proposed new locking location strategy can
significantly reduce the output corruptibility, which is consistent with the guessing entropy
trend shown in Fig. 7.22.
Key Retrieval Rate and Speed in Large Circuit
We also evaluated the CPA resilience for the locking configurations in a larger benchmark
circuit, c3540. We used FLL to configure the XOR-based locking and the proposed strategy
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Table 7.6: Cone-based CPA attack effort and its KRR.
FLL XOR NEWLOC PSLNPL NEWLOC PPLNSL
KRR 6.25% 0% 0%
Iteration 1300 1032 6667
Execution time 0.36 hours 0.29 hours 1.85 hours
to configure the PSLNPL and PPLNSL locking. 32 key bits were inserted for each locking.
We define 1 day as the time limit so that the logic cone in which the CPA attack takes
more than 24 hours is considered as no key bit will be retrieved. The KRR results based
on 4000 power traces are shown in Table 7.6. The CPA attack obtains a KRR of 6.25%
for the case of XOR-based locking. However, the CPA attack cannot retrieve any key bit
in the cases of PSLNPL and PPLNSL locking. Based on the fact that one iteration takes
around 1 second in our CPA algorithm ran on a computer at 1.8GHz and with 8GB memory,
we estimate the averaged execution time that the CPA attack will take on one logic cone.
The comparison of the averaged execution time is listed in Table 7.6. Interestingly, a lower
KRR does not necessarily represent a higher attack effort, as the NEWLOC PSLNPL case
actually consumes less iterations and execution time than the FLL XOR case.
7.8 Conclusion
The nature of M3D tiers being fabricated by one single foundry makes the split manufacturing
strategy not applicable for securing M3D ICs from IP piracy attacks. The transistor-level
logic locking technique has been proposed to encrypt the original function of the M3D ICs
under protection. However, limited works evaluate the strength of transistor-level logic
locking on resisting power analysis attacks. This chapter proposes a CPA attack flow that
is applicable to the transistor-level logic locking. Our analysis and experimental results
indicate that the proposed CPA attack outperforms the DPA attack in transistor-level logic
locking and achieves a 100% KRR in the locked c432 with 4000 power traces. Furthermore,
we propose two methods to improve the CPA resilience of transistor-level logic locking.
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First, a logic-cone conjunction (LCC) method is introduced to enlarge the key space. Our
case study on c432 shows that our method can successfully reduce the KRR to zero with
negligible overhead on delay and power. Furthermore, we propose three rules as a guideline
for the key insertion of transistor-level locking. Our experimental results show that our
method improves the guessing entropy by 25.36× and 26.04× for PSLNPL and PPLNSL,





This dissertation investigates the security of an emerging technology, 3D IC, and provides
solutions for the potential security attacks to it. We first reveal a security threat of hard-
ware Trojans to 3D ICs and further provide novel countermeasures to fill the gap in the
existing literature of missing effective protection schemes. Our research also protects the
confidential information in 3D ICs from side-channel leakage using more effective and less
costly methods comparing to existing protection mechanisms. This dissertation makes an
important contribution not only to the hardware security community but also to building
a reliable and trusted 3D world in the future. To continue this study, more works can be
done in combining the existing Trojan detection methods with the proposed 3D IC testing
framework and extending the proposed key insertion guideline to be compatible with various
specific logic locking techniques.
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